Daily Papers

Cost-aware routing dynamically dispatches user queries to models of varying capability to balance performance and inference cost. However, the routing strategy introduces a new security concern that adversaries may manipulate the router to consistently select expensive high-capability models. Existing routing attacks depend on either white-box access or heuristic prompts, rendering them ineffective in real-world black-box scenarios. In this work, we propose R^2A, which aims to mislead black-box LLM routers to expensive models via adversarial suffix optimization. Specifically, R^2A deploys a hybrid ensemble surrogate router to mimic the black-box router. A suffix optimization algorithm is further adapted for the ensemble-based surrogate. Extensive experiments on multiple open-source and commercial routing systems demonstrate that {R^2A} significantly increases the routing rate to expensive models on queries of different distributions. Code and examples: https://github.com/thcxiker/R2A-Attack.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

Gradient optimization-based adversarial attack methods automate the learning of adversarial triggers to generate jailbreak prompts or leak system prompts. In this work, we take a closer look at the optimization objective of adversarial trigger learning and propose ATLA: Adversarial Trigger Learning with Augmented objectives. ATLA improves the negative log-likelihood loss used by previous studies into a weighted loss formulation that encourages the learned adversarial triggers to optimize more towards response format tokens. This enables ATLA to learn an adversarial trigger from just one query-response pair and the learned trigger generalizes well to other similar queries. We further design a variation to augment trigger optimization with an auxiliary loss that suppresses evasive responses. We showcase how to use ATLA to learn adversarial suffixes jailbreaking LLMs and to extract hidden system prompts. Empirically we demonstrate that ATLA consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art techniques, achieving nearly 100% success in attacking while requiring 80% fewer queries. ATLA learned jailbreak suffixes demonstrate high generalization to unseen queries and transfer well to new LLMs. We released our code https://github.com/QData/ALTA_Augmented_Adversarial_Trigger_Learning

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive proficiency across a range of natural language processing tasks yet remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak attacks, carefully designed to elicit harmful responses from LLMs. Traditional methods rely on manual heuristics, which suffer from limited generalizability. While being automatic, optimization-based attacks often produce unnatural jailbreak prompts that are easy to detect by safety filters or require high computational overhead due to discrete token optimization. Witnessing the limitations of existing jailbreak methods, we introduce Generative Adversarial Suffix Prompter (GASP), a novel framework that combines human-readable prompt generation with Latent Bayesian Optimization (LBO) to improve adversarial suffix creation in a fully black-box setting. GASP leverages LBO to craft adversarial suffixes by efficiently exploring continuous embedding spaces, gradually optimizing the model to improve attack efficacy while balancing prompt coherence through a targeted iterative refinement procedure. Our experiments show that GASP can generate natural jailbreak prompts, significantly improving attack success rates, reducing training times, and accelerating inference speed, thus making it an efficient and scalable solution for red-teaming LLMs.

The safety defense methods of Large language models(LLMs) stays limited because the dangerous prompts are manually curated to just few known attack types, which fails to keep pace with emerging varieties. Recent studies found that attaching suffixes to harmful instructions can hack the defense of LLMs and lead to dangerous outputs. However, similar to traditional text adversarial attacks, this approach, while effective, is limited by the challenge of the discrete tokens. This gradient based discrete optimization attack requires over 100,000 LLM calls, and due to the unreadable of adversarial suffixes, it can be relatively easily penetrated by common defense methods such as perplexity filters. To cope with this challenge, in this paper, we proposes an Adversarial Suffix Embedding Translation Framework (ASETF), aimed at transforming continuous adversarial suffix embeddings into coherent and understandable text. This method greatly reduces the computational overhead during the attack process and helps to automatically generate multiple adversarial samples, which can be used as data to strengthen LLMs security defense. Experimental evaluations were conducted on Llama2, Vicuna, and other prominent LLMs, employing harmful directives sourced from the Advbench dataset. The results indicate that our method significantly reduces the computation time of adversarial suffixes and achieves a much better attack success rate to existing techniques, while significantly enhancing the textual fluency of the prompts. In addition, our approach can be generalized into a broader method for generating transferable adversarial suffixes that can successfully attack multiple LLMs, even black-box LLMs, such as ChatGPT and Gemini.

Language models are vulnerable to short adversarial suffixes that can reliably alter predictions. Previous works usually find such suffixes with gradient search or rule-based methods, but these are brittle and often tied to a single task or model. In this paper, a reinforcement learning framework is used where the suffix is treated as a policy and trained with Proximal Policy Optimization against a frozen model as a reward oracle. Rewards are shaped using calibrated cross-entropy, removing label bias and aggregating across surface forms to improve transferability. The proposed method is evaluated on five diverse NLP benchmark datasets, covering sentiment, natural language inference, paraphrase, and commonsense reasoning, using three distinct language models: Qwen2-1.5B Instruct, TinyLlama-1.1B Chat, and Phi-1.5. Results show that RL-trained suffixes consistently degrade accuracy and transfer more effectively across tasks and models than previous adversarial triggers of similar genres.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent and integrated into autonomous systems, ensuring their safety is imperative. Despite significant strides toward safety alignment, recent work GCG~zou2023universal proposes a discrete token optimization algorithm and selects the single suffix with the lowest loss to successfully jailbreak aligned LLMs. In this work, we first discuss the drawbacks of solely picking the suffix with the lowest loss during GCG optimization for jailbreaking and uncover the missed successful suffixes during the intermediate steps. Moreover, we utilize those successful suffixes as training data to learn a generative model, named AmpleGCG, which captures the distribution of adversarial suffixes given a harmful query and enables the rapid generation of hundreds of suffixes for any harmful queries in seconds. AmpleGCG achieves near 100\% attack success rate (ASR) on two aligned LLMs (Llama-2-7B-chat and Vicuna-7B), surpassing two strongest attack baselines. More interestingly, AmpleGCG also transfers seamlessly to attack different models, including closed-source LLMs, achieving a 99\% ASR on the latest GPT-3.5. To summarize, our work amplifies the impact of GCG by training a generative model of adversarial suffixes that is universal to any harmful queries and transferable from attacking open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs. In addition, it can generate 200 adversarial suffixes for one harmful query in only 4 seconds, rendering it more challenging to defend.

Adversarial prompt attacks can significantly alter the reliability of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems by re-ranking them to produce incorrect outputs. In this paper, we present a novel method that applies Differential Evolution (DE) to optimize adversarial prompt suffixes for RAG-based question answering. Our approach is gradient-free, treating the RAG pipeline as a black box and evolving a population of candidate suffixes to maximize the retrieval rank of a targeted incorrect document to be closer to real world scenarios. We conducted experiments on the BEIR QA datasets to evaluate attack success at certain retrieval rank thresholds under multiple retrieving applications. Our results demonstrate that DE-based prompt optimization attains competitive (and in some cases higher) success rates compared to GGPP to dense retrievers and PRADA to sparse retrievers, while using only a small number of tokens (<=5 tokens) in the adversarial suffix. Furthermore, we introduce a readability-aware suffix construction strategy, validated by a statistically significant reduction in MLM negative log-likelihood with Welch's t-test. Through evaluations with a BERT-based adversarial suffix detector, we show that DE-generated suffixes evade detection, yielding near-chance detection accuracy.

Language models (LMs) are often used as zero-shot or few-shot classifiers by scoring label words, but they remain fragile to adversarial prompts. Prior work typically optimizes task- or model-specific triggers, making results difficult to compare and limiting transferability. We study universal adversarial suffixes: short token sequences (4-10 tokens) that, when appended to any input, broadly reduce accuracy across tasks and models. Our approach learns the suffix in a differentiable "soft" form using Gumbel-Softmax relaxation and then discretizes it for inference. Training maximizes calibrated cross-entropy on the label region while masking gold tokens to prevent trivial leakage, with entropy regularization to avoid collapse. A single suffix trained on one model transfers effectively to others, consistently lowering both accuracy and calibrated confidence. Experiments on sentiment analysis, natural language inference, paraphrase detection, commonsense QA, and physical reasoning with Qwen2-1.5B, Phi-1.5, and TinyLlama-1.1B demonstrate consistent attack effectiveness and transfer across tasks and model families.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Although large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned, they remain vulnerable to jailbreaking through either carefully crafted prompts in natural language or, interestingly, gibberish adversarial suffixes. However, gibberish tokens have received relatively less attention despite their success in attacking aligned LLMs. Recent work, AmpleGCG~liao2024amplegcg, demonstrates that a generative model can quickly produce numerous customizable gibberish adversarial suffixes for any harmful query, exposing a range of alignment gaps in out-of-distribution (OOD) language spaces. To bring more attention to this area, we introduce AmpleGCG-Plus, an enhanced version that achieves better performance in fewer attempts. Through a series of exploratory experiments, we identify several training strategies to improve the learning of gibberish suffixes. Our results, verified under a strict evaluation setting, show that it outperforms AmpleGCG on both open-weight and closed-source models, achieving increases in attack success rate (ASR) of up to 17\% in the white-box setting against Llama-2-7B-chat, and more than tripling ASR in the black-box setting against GPT-4. Notably, AmpleGCG-Plus jailbreaks the newer GPT-4o series of models at similar rates to GPT-4, and, uncovers vulnerabilities against the recently proposed circuit breakers defense. We publicly release AmpleGCG-Plus along with our collected training datasets.

Recent research has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated jailbreak attacks, where adversarial suffixes crafted by algorithms appended to harmful queries bypass safety alignment and trigger unintended responses. Current methods for generating these suffixes are computationally expensive and have low Attack Success Rates (ASR), especially against well-aligned models like Llama2 and Llama3. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ADV-LLM, an iterative self-tuning process that crafts adversarial LLMs with enhanced jailbreak ability. Our framework significantly reduces the computational cost of generating adversarial suffixes while achieving nearly 100\% ASR on various open-source LLMs. Moreover, it exhibits strong attack transferability to closed-source models, achieving 99\% ASR on GPT-3.5 and 49\% ASR on GPT-4, despite being optimized solely on Llama3. Beyond improving jailbreak ability, ADV-LLM provides valuable insights for future safety alignment research through its ability to generate large datasets for studying LLM safety.

We study suffix-based jailbreaksx2013a powerful family of attacks against large language models (LLMs) that optimize adversarial suffixes to circumvent safety alignment. Focusing on the widely used foundational GCG attack (Zou et al., 2023), we observe that suffixes vary in efficacy: some markedly more universalx2013generalizing to many unseen harmful instructionsx2013than others. We first show that GCG's effectiveness is driven by a shallow, critical mechanism, built on the information flow from the adversarial suffix to the final chat template tokens before generation. Quantifying the dominance of this mechanism during generation, we find GCG irregularly and aggressively hijacks the contextualization process. Crucially, we tie hijacking to the universality phenomenon, with more universal suffixes being stronger hijackers. Subsequently, we show that these insights have practical implications: GCG universality can be efficiently enhanced (up to times5 in some cases) at no additional computational cost, and can also be surgically mitigated, at least halving attack success with minimal utility loss. We release our code and data at http://github.com/matanbt/interp-jailbreak.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

A novel hack involving Large Language Models (LLMs) has emerged, exploiting adversarial suffixes to deceive models into generating perilous responses. Such jailbreaks can trick LLMs into providing intricate instructions to a malicious user for creating explosives, orchestrating a bank heist, or facilitating the creation of offensive content. By evaluating the perplexity of queries with adversarial suffixes using an open-source LLM (GPT-2), we found that they have exceedingly high perplexity values. As we explored a broad range of regular (non-adversarial) prompt varieties, we concluded that false positives are a significant challenge for plain perplexity filtering. A Light-GBM trained on perplexity and token length resolved the false positives and correctly detected most adversarial attacks in the test set.

Lossless acceleration schemes, such as speculative decoding, promise significant inference speedups by relying on dynamic token-level alignment between a draft and a target model. However, this guarantee of semantic equivalence masks a severe operational vulnerability: draft-target alignment can be systematically attacked. In this paper, we introduce ADSD, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first prompt-suffix attack that collapses verifier acceptance by pushing draft probability mass toward tokens the target is unlikely to accept. ADSD uses Soft-Collapse, a verifier-aligned surrogate derived from the asymmetric speculative acceptance rule, together with a target-preservation objective that discourages obvious task corruption. ADSD successfully generates highly effective adversarial suffixes. On the GSM8K dataset, our attack increases the mean sample time by 62.3% while preserving the task quality. We further show that this vulnerability exists across different domains, speculative decoding strategies, and model architectures.

Recently, prefix-tuning has gained increasing attention as a parameter-efficient finetuning method for large-scale pretrained language models. The method keeps the pretrained models fixed and only updates the prefix token parameters for each downstream task. Despite being lightweight and modular, prefix-tuning still lacks robustness to textual adversarial attacks. However, most currently developed defense techniques necessitate auxiliary model update and storage, which inevitably hamper the modularity and low storage of prefix-tuning. In this work, we propose a robust prefix-tuning framework that preserves the efficiency and modularity of prefix-tuning. The core idea of our framework is leveraging the layerwise activations of the language model by correctly-classified training data as the standard for additional prefix finetuning. During the test phase, an extra batch-level prefix is tuned for each batch and added to the original prefix for robustness enhancement. Extensive experiments on three text classification benchmarks show that our framework substantially improves robustness over several strong baselines against five textual attacks of different types while maintaining comparable accuracy on clean texts. We also interpret our robust prefix-tuning framework from the optimal control perspective and pose several directions for future research.

LLM have achieved success in many fields but still troubled by problematic content in the training corpora. LLM unlearning aims at reducing their influence and avoid undesirable behaviours. However, existing unlearning methods remain vulnerable to adversarial queries and the unlearned knowledge resurfaces after the manually designed attack queries. As part of a red-team effort to proactively assess the vulnerabilities of unlearned models, we design Dynamic Unlearning Attack (DUA), a dynamic and automated framework to attack these models and evaluate their robustness. It optimizes adversarial suffixes to reintroduce the unlearned knowledge in various scenarios. We find that unlearned knowledge can be recovered in 55.2% of the questions, even without revealing the unlearned model's parameters. In response to this vulnerability, we propose Latent Adversarial Unlearning (LAU), a universal framework that effectively enhances the robustness of the unlearned process. It formulates the unlearning process as a min-max optimization problem and resolves it through two stages: an attack stage, where perturbation vectors are trained and added to the latent space of LLMs to recover the unlearned knowledge, and a defense stage, where previously trained perturbation vectors are used to enhance unlearned model's robustness. With our LAU framework, we obtain two robust unlearning methods, AdvGA and AdvNPO. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple unlearning benchmarks and various models, and demonstrate that they improve the unlearning effectiveness by over 53.5%, cause only less than a 11.6% reduction in neighboring knowledge, and have almost no impact on the model's general capabilities.

Jailbreaking attacks on the vision modality typically rely on imperceptible adversarial perturbations, whereas attacks on the textual modality are generally assumed to require visible modifications (e.g., non-semantic suffixes). In this paper, we introduce imperceptible jailbreaks that exploit a class of Unicode characters called variation selectors. By appending invisible variation selectors to malicious questions, the jailbreak prompts appear visually identical to original malicious questions on screen, while their tokenization is "secretly" altered. We propose a chain-of-search pipeline to generate such adversarial suffixes to induce harmful responses. Our experiments show that our imperceptible jailbreaks achieve high attack success rates against four aligned LLMs and generalize to prompt injection attacks, all without producing any visible modifications in the written prompt. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/imperceptible-jailbreaks.

Neural Machine Translation (NMT) systems are used in various applications. However, it has been shown that they are vulnerable to very small perturbations of their inputs, known as adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a new targeted adversarial attack against NMT models. In particular, our goal is to insert a predefined target keyword into the translation of the adversarial sentence while maintaining similarity between the original sentence and the perturbed one in the source domain. To this aim, we propose an optimization problem, including an adversarial loss term and a similarity term. We use gradient projection in the embedding space to craft an adversarial sentence. Experimental results show that our attack outperforms Seq2Sick, the other targeted adversarial attack against NMT models, in terms of success rate and decrease in translation quality. Our attack succeeds in inserting a keyword into the translation for more than 75% of sentences while similarity with the original sentence stays preserved.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework for defending against adversarial prompts with certifiable safety guarantees. Given a prompt, our procedure erases tokens individually and inspects the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our safety certificate guarantees that harmful prompts are not mislabeled as safe due to an adversarial attack up to a certain size. We implement the safety filter in two ways, using Llama 2 and DistilBERT, and compare the performance of erase-and-check for the two cases. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, where an adversarial sequence is appended at the end of a harmful prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Our experimental results demonstrate that this procedure can obtain strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good empirical performance on safe prompts. Additionally, we propose three efficient empirical defenses: i) RandEC, a randomized subsampling version of erase-and-check; ii) GreedyEC, which greedily erases tokens that maximize the softmax score of the harmful class; and iii) GradEC, which uses gradient information to optimize tokens to erase. We demonstrate their effectiveness against adversarial prompts generated by the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack algorithm. The code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/certified-llm-safety.

It has been shown that Large Language Model (LLM) alignments can be circumvented by appending specially crafted attack suffixes with harmful queries to elicit harmful responses. To conduct attacks against private target models whose characterization is unknown, public models can be used as proxies to fashion the attack, with successful attacks being transferred from public proxies to private target models. The success rate of attack depends on how closely the proxy model approximates the private model. We hypothesize that for attacks to be transferrable, it is sufficient if the proxy can approximate the target model in the neighborhood of the harmful query. Therefore, in this paper, we propose Local Fine-Tuning (LoFT), i.e., fine-tuning proxy models on similar queries that lie in the lexico-semantic neighborhood of harmful queries to decrease the divergence between the proxy and target models. First, we demonstrate three approaches to prompt private target models to obtain similar queries given harmful queries. Next, we obtain data for local fine-tuning by eliciting responses from target models for the generated similar queries. Then, we optimize attack suffixes to generate attack prompts and evaluate the impact of our local fine-tuning on the attack's success rate. Experiments show that local fine-tuning of proxy models improves attack transferability and increases attack success rate by 39%, 7%, and 0.5% (absolute) on target models ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Claude respectively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned to align with human values often exhibit alignment drift, producing unsafe or policy-violating completions when exposed to adversarial prompts, decoding perturbations, or paraphrased jailbreaks. While prior work has behaviorally characterized alignment failure, little is known about the training-time belief sources underlying these failures. We introduce TraceAlign, a unified framework for tracing unsafe completions back to their root causes in the model's training corpus. Central to our approach is the Belief Conflict Index (BCI), which quantifies semantic inconsistency between generated spans and aligned policies, based on retrieved training documents using suffix-array matching. We propose three complementary interventions: (i) TraceShield, an inference-time safety filter that refuses completions with high-BCI spans, (ii) Contrastive Belief Deconfliction Loss, a contrastive fine-tuning objective penalizing high-BCI continuations during DPO, and (iii) Prov-Decode, a provenance-aware decoding strategy that vetoes beam expansions predicted to yield high-BCI spans. Together, these defenses reduce alignment drift by up to 85% on our curated Alignment Drift Benchmark (ADB) while preserving utility on standard tasks, with delta less than 0.2 and improved refusal quality. We further derive a theoretical upper bound on drift likelihood via suffix-array span statistics, linking memorization frequency and length to adversarial reactivation risk. TraceAlign thus provides the first scalable, traceable, and grounded toolkit for understanding and mitigating alignment failures at source. To encourage further exploration and development, we open-source our implementation at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/tracealign-2DA7

We present an ultra-fast and flexible search algorithm that enables search over trillion-scale natural language corpora in under 0.3 seconds while handling semantic variations (substitution, insertion, and deletion). Our approach employs string matching based on suffix arrays that scales well with corpus size. To mitigate the combinatorial explosion induced by the semantic relaxation of queries, our method is built on two key algorithmic ideas: fast exact lookup enabled by a disk-aware design, and dynamic corpus-aware pruning. We theoretically show that the proposed method suppresses exponential growth in the search space with respect to query length by leveraging statistical properties of natural language. In experiments on FineWeb-Edu (Lozhkov et al., 2024) (1.4T tokens), we show that our method achieves significantly lower search latency than existing methods: infini-gram (Liu et al., 2024), infini-gram mini (Xu et al., 2025), and SoftMatcha (Deguchi et al., 2025). As a practical application, we demonstrate that our method identifies benchmark contamination in training corpora, unidentified by existing approaches. We also provide an online demo of fast, soft search across corpora in seven languages.

Current LLM pipelines account for only one possible tokenization for a given string, ignoring exponentially many alternative tokenizations during training and inference. For example, the standard Llama3 tokenization of penguin is [p,enguin], yet [peng,uin] is another perfectly valid alternative. In this paper, we show that despite LLMs being trained solely on one tokenization, they still retain semantic understanding of other tokenizations, raising questions about their implications in LLM safety. Put succinctly, we answer the following question: can we adversarially tokenize an obviously malicious string to evade safety and alignment restrictions? We show that not only is adversarial tokenization an effective yet previously neglected axis of attack, but it is also competitive against existing state-of-the-art adversarial approaches without changing the text of the harmful request. We empirically validate this exploit across three state-of-the-art LLMs and adversarial datasets, revealing a previously unknown vulnerability in subword models.

Speculative decoding is widely adopted to reduce latency in large language model (LLM) inference by leveraging smaller draft models capable of handling diverse user tasks. However, emerging AI applications, such as LLM-based agents, present unique workload characteristics: instead of diverse independent requests, agentic frameworks typically submit repetitive inference requests, such as multi-agent pipelines performing similar subtasks or self-refinement loops iteratively enhancing outputs. These workloads result in long and highly predictable sequences, which current speculative decoding methods do not effectively exploit. To address this gap, we introduce SuffixDecoding, a novel method that utilizes efficient suffix trees to cache long token sequences from prompts and previous outputs. By adaptively speculating more tokens when acceptance likelihood is high and fewer when it is low, SuffixDecoding effectively exploits opportunities for longer speculations while conserving computation when those opportunities are limited. Evaluations on agentic benchmarks, including SWE-Bench and Text-to-SQL, demonstrate that SuffixDecoding achieves speedups of up to 5.3times, outperforming state-of-the-art methods -- 2.8times faster than model-based approaches like EAGLE-2/3 and 1.9times faster than model-free approaches such as Token Recycling. SuffixDecoding is open-sourced at https://github.com/snowflakedb/ArcticInference

The widespread use of Text-to-Image (T2I) models in content generation requires careful examination of their safety, including their robustness to adversarial attacks. Despite extensive research on adversarial attacks, the reasons for their effectiveness remain underexplored. This paper presents an empirical study on adversarial attacks against T2I models, focusing on analyzing factors associated with attack success rates (ASR). We introduce a new attack objective - entity swapping using adversarial suffixes and two gradient-based attack algorithms. Human and automatic evaluations reveal the asymmetric nature of ASRs on entity swap: for example, it is easier to replace "human" with "robot" in the prompt "a human dancing in the rain." with an adversarial suffix, but the reverse replacement is significantly harder. We further propose probing metrics to establish indicative signals from the model's beliefs to the adversarial ASR. We identify conditions that result in a success probability of 60% for adversarial attacks and others where this likelihood drops below 5%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed as evaluators (LLM-as-a-Judge) for assessing the quality of machine-generated text. This paradigm offers scalability and cost-effectiveness compared to human annotation. However, the reliability and security of such systems, particularly their robustness against adversarial manipulations, remain critical concerns. This paper investigates the vulnerability of LLM-as-a-Judge architectures to prompt-injection attacks, where malicious inputs are designed to compromise the judge's decision-making process. We formalize two primary attack strategies: Comparative Undermining Attack (CUA), which directly targets the final decision output, and Justification Manipulation Attack (JMA), which aims to alter the model's generated reasoning. Using the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) optimization method, we craft adversarial suffixes appended to one of the responses being compared. Experiments conducted on the MT-Bench Human Judgments dataset with open-source instruction-tuned LLMs (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct and Falcon3-3B-Instruct) demonstrate significant susceptibility. The CUA achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) exceeding 30\%, while JMA also shows notable effectiveness. These findings highlight substantial vulnerabilities in current LLM-as-a-Judge systems, underscoring the need for robust defense mechanisms and further research into adversarial evaluation and trustworthiness in LLM-based assessment frameworks.

Training on only perfect Standard English corpora predisposes pre-trained neural networks to discriminate against minorities from non-standard linguistic backgrounds (e.g., African American Vernacular English, Colloquial Singapore English, etc.). We perturb the inflectional morphology of words to craft plausible and semantically similar adversarial examples that expose these biases in popular NLP models, e.g., BERT and Transformer, and show that adversarially fine-tuning them for a single epoch significantly improves robustness without sacrificing performance on clean data.

Diffusion-based Large Language Models (dLLMs) parallelize text generation by framing decoding as a denoising process, but suffer from high computational overhead since they predict all future suffix tokens at each step while retaining only a small fraction. We propose Diffusion Scratchpad (DPad), a training-free method that restricts attention to a small set of nearby suffix tokens, preserving fidelity while eliminating redundancy. DPad integrates two strategies: (i) a sliding window, which maintains a fixed-length suffix window, and (ii) distance-decay dropout, which deterministically removes distant suffix tokens before attention computation. This simple design is compatible with existing optimizations such as prefix caching and can be implemented with only a few lines of code. Comprehensive evaluations across multiple benchmarks on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream models demonstrate that DPad delivers up to 61.4times speedup over vanilla dLLMs while maintaining comparable accuracy, highlighting its potential for efficient and scalable long-sequence inference. Our code is available at https://github.com/Crys-Chen/DPad.

Prompting and contextual-based fine-tuning methods, which we call Prefix Learning, have been proposed to enhance the performance of language models on various downstream tasks that can match full parameter fine-tuning. There remains a limited theoretical understanding of how these methods work. In this paper, we aim to relieve this limitation by studying the learning ability of Prefix Learning from the perspective of prefix length. In particular, we approximate the infinite-long Prefix Learning optimization process by the Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK) technique. We formulate and solve it as a learning problem of the infinite-long prefix in a one-layer attention network. Our results confirm the over-parameterization property and arbitrary small loss convergence guarantee of the infinite-long Prefix Learning in attention. To the implementation end, we propose our NTK-Attention method, which is "equivalent" to attention computation with arbitrary prefix length efficiently. Its time complexity mainly depends on the sub-quadratic of input length (without prefix), and our method only requires d^2 + d extra parameters for representation, where d is the feature dimension. In addition, we conducted experiments that compare our NTK-Attention with full parameters fine-tuning, LoRA, and P-Tuning V2 methods across vision or natural language datasets. The results indicate our approach may be a promising parameter-efficient-fine-tuning method since it has demonstrated superior performance in numerous scenarios. Our code can be found at https://github.com/ChristianYang37/chiwun/tree/main/src/NTK-Attention.

Unlike autoregressive models, which generate one token at a time, dLLMs denoise a chunk of [MASK] tokens jointly and sample one or more tokens per step; despite enabling parallel decoding, this process incurs substantial computational cost due to the large chunk size of masked tokens. We observe that much of this cost is spent on repeatedly processing the preceding context and many [MASK] tokens with the same feature representations, indicating considerable computational redundancy. In this work, we revisit dLLM's redundancy from the perspective of [MASK] tokens. Through systematic analysis, we verify the redundancy of [MASK] tokens while revealing their critical role in providing structural information. Guided by these findings, we propose position-preserving [MASK] token compression and terminal-aware augmentation. By compressing redundant [MASK] computation, this approach accelerates decoding and further provides a natural extension toward context-folding-like long-context scaling under limited input-length constraints for full-sequence dLLMs such as LLaDA-8B-Instruct and LLaDA-1.5. Moreover, for block dLLMs such as LLaDA2.0-mini, it augments the context with a protected terminal [MASK] token to enhance generation quality with negligible overhead.

As text-to-image generative models advance, they raise critical safety concerns, particularly the generation of Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content such as violence and nudity, further exacerbated by red-teaming adversarial attacks. Existing defenses predominantly operate under white-box assumptions, relying on text encoder optimization, weight editing, or inference-time intervention, and fundamentally cannot scale to proprietary models. Black-box alternatives based on LLM prompt rewriting offer broader applicability, yet fail in a critical regime we identify as the benign adversarial problem: prompts that are linguistically safe but still trigger harmful generation due to the model's learned data distribution. We propose DiSCO, a zero-shot, strictly black-box defense that operates entirely at the prompt level as a plug-and-play module, requiring no model retraining, fine-tuning, or access to model internals. DiSCO performs distribution-guided suffix expansion via beam search, optimized through contrastive scoring over safe and unsafe image pools generated by the target model itself, with iterative adaptive feedback until safe content is produced. We demonstrate that DiSCO consistently enhances the safety of both undefended and defended models on the I2P benchmark under multiple red-teaming attacks, achieving 37.7% and 25.13% ASR reduction, respectively, while maintaining semantic fidelity and improving image coherence. As a black-box, architecture-agnostic module, DiSCO can be readily applied to any text-to-image system without necessitating any changes to the model itself.

Recently, there has been significant progress in studying neural networks to translate text descriptions into SQL queries. Despite achieving good performance on some public benchmarks, existing text-to-SQL models typically rely on the lexical matching between words in natural language (NL) questions and tokens in table schemas, which may render the models vulnerable to attacks that break the schema linking mechanism. In this work, we investigate the robustness of text-to-SQL models to synonym substitution. In particular, we introduce Spider-Syn, a human-curated dataset based on the Spider benchmark for text-to-SQL translation. NL questions in Spider-Syn are modified from Spider, by replacing their schema-related words with manually selected synonyms that reflect real-world question paraphrases. We observe that the accuracy dramatically drops by eliminating such explicit correspondence between NL questions and table schemas, even if the synonyms are not adversarially selected to conduct worst-case adversarial attacks. Finally, we present two categories of approaches to improve the model robustness. The first category of approaches utilizes additional synonym annotations for table schemas by modifying the model input, while the second category is based on adversarial training. We demonstrate that both categories of approaches significantly outperform their counterparts without the defense, and the first category of approaches are more effective.

Large pre-trained language models achieve impressive results across many tasks. However, recent works point out that pre-trained language models may memorize a considerable fraction of their training data, leading to the privacy risk of information leakage. In this paper, we propose a method named Ethicist for targeted training data extraction through loss smoothed soft prompting and calibrated confidence estimation, investigating how to recover the suffix in the training data when given a prefix. To elicit memorization in the attacked model, we tune soft prompt embeddings while keeping the model fixed. We further propose a smoothing loss that smooths the loss distribution of the suffix tokens to make it easier to sample the correct suffix. In order to select the most probable suffix from a collection of sampled suffixes and estimate the prediction confidence, we propose a calibrated confidence estimation method, which normalizes the confidence of the generated suffixes with a local estimation. We show that Ethicist significantly improves the extraction performance on a recently proposed public benchmark. We also investigate several factors influencing the data extraction performance, including decoding strategy, model scale, prefix length, and suffix length. Our code is available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Targeted-Data-Extraction.

Block diffusion accelerates speculative decoding by drafting multiple tokens in one forward pass. However, each position predicts a marginal distribution without observing earlier proposed tokens, limiting draft quality and acceptance length. We identify a concrete failure, the repetition trap, in which neighboring positions produce redundant copies of the same token. We explain this tendency theoretically and empirically examine its association with shorter accepted drafts. Recent methods refine marginal predictions with an additional causal head or a separately trained drafter, increasing parameter storage and introducing separate training objectives. We instead propose D-Loop, which introduces intra-block causal conditioning within the original diffusion drafter without additional model components. Inspired by semi-autoregressive generation and parameter sharing, D-Loop reuses the same backbone across looped passes. The first pass proposes a block, and the second conditions on a selected prefix to regenerate the suffix in parallel. A complementary prefix--suffix objective trains the shared drafter for both anchor-only prefix prediction and prefix-conditioned suffix prediction. Across eight math, code, and chat benchmarks, D-Loop can beat DFlash and DSpark on Qwen3-4B and Qwen3-8B with obvious gains.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

Fine-tuning is the de facto way to leverage large pretrained language models to perform downstream tasks. However, it modifies all the language model parameters and therefore necessitates storing a full copy for each task. In this paper, we propose prefix-tuning, a lightweight alternative to fine-tuning for natural language generation tasks, which keeps language model parameters frozen, but optimizes a small continuous task-specific vector (called the prefix). Prefix-tuning draws inspiration from prompting, allowing subsequent tokens to attend to this prefix as if it were "virtual tokens". We apply prefix-tuning to GPT-2 for table-to-text generation and to BART for summarization. We find that by learning only 0.1\% of the parameters, prefix-tuning obtains comparable performance in the full data setting, outperforms fine-tuning in low-data settings, and extrapolates better to examples with topics unseen during training.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at various tasks, including solving math word problems (MWPs), but struggle with real-world problems containing irrelevant information. To address this, we propose a prompting framework that generates adversarial variants of MWPs by adding irrelevant variables. We introduce a dataset, ProbleMATHIC, containing both adversarial and non-adversarial MWPs. Our experiments reveal that LLMs are susceptible to distraction by numerical noise, resulting in an average relative performance drop of ~26% on adversarial MWPs. To mitigate this, we fine-tune LLMs (Llama-2, Mistral) on the adversarial samples from our dataset. Fine-tuning on adversarial training instances improves performance on adversarial MWPs by ~8%, indicating increased robustness to noise and better ability to identify relevant data for reasoning. Finally, to assess the generalizability of our prompting framework, we introduce GSM-8K-Adv, an adversarial variant of the GSM-8K benchmark. LLMs continue to struggle when faced with adversarial information, reducing performance by up to ~6%.

Increasing the input length has been a driver of progress in language modeling with transformers. We identify conditions where shorter inputs are not harmful, and achieve perplexity and efficiency improvements through two new methods that decrease input length. First, we show that initially training a model on short subsequences before moving on to longer ones both reduces overall training time and, surprisingly, substantially improves perplexity. Second, we show how to improve the efficiency of recurrence methods in transformers, which let models condition on previously processed tokens when generating sequences that exceed the maximal length the transformer can handle at once. Existing methods require computationally expensive relative position embeddings; we introduce a simple alternative of adding absolute position embeddings to queries and keys instead of to word embeddings, which efficiently produces superior results. We show that these recurrent models also benefit from short input lengths. Combining these techniques speeds up training by a factor of 1.65, reduces memory usage, and substantially improves perplexity on WikiText-103, without adding any parameters.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) frameworks improve the accuracy of large language models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge from retrieved documents, thereby overcoming the limitations of models' static intrinsic knowledge. However, these systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks that manipulate the retrieval process by introducing documents that are adversarial yet semantically similar to the query. Notably, while these adversarial documents resemble the query, they exhibit weak similarity to benign documents in the retrieval set. Thus, we propose a simple yet effective Graph-based Reranking against Adversarial Document Attacks (GRADA) framework aiming at preserving retrieval quality while significantly reducing the success of adversaries. Our study evaluates the effectiveness of our approach through experiments conducted on five LLMs: GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4o, Llama3.1-8b, Llama3.1-70b, and Qwen2.5-7b. We use three datasets to assess performance, with results from the Natural Questions dataset demonstrating up to an 80% reduction in attack success rates while maintaining minimal loss in accuracy.

Generalizing to longer sentences is important for recent Transformer-based language models. Besides algorithms manipulating explicit position features, the success of Transformers without position encodings (NoPE) provides a new way to overcome the challenge. In this paper, we study the length generalization property of NoPE. We find that although NoPE can extend to longer sequences than the commonly used explicit position encodings, it still has a limited context length. We identify a connection between the failure of NoPE's generalization and the distraction of attention distributions. We propose a parameter-efficient tuning for searching attention heads' best temperature hyper-parameters, which substantially expands NoPE's context size. Experiments on long sequence language modeling, the synthetic passkey retrieval task and real-world long context tasks show that NoPE can achieve competitive performances with state-of-the-art length generalization algorithms. The source code is publicly accessible

Standard subword tokenization methods fragment numbers inconsistently, causing large language models (LLMs) to lose positional and decimal structure - a primary driver of errors in arithmetic and scientific reasoning. We introduce Triadic Suffix Tokenization (TST), a deterministic scheme that partitions digits into three-digit triads and annotates each triad with an explicit magnitude marker. Critically, the scheme defines a fixed, one-to-one mapping between suffixes and orders of magnitude for the integer part (thousands, millions, billions, etc.) and a parallel system of replicated markers for fractional depth (tenths, thousandths, millionths, etc.). Unlike approaches that rely on positional inference, this method provides a consistent gradient signal, which should ensure stable convergence. Two implementation variants are proposed: (1) a vocabulary-based approach that adds at most 10,000 fixed tokens to an existing vocabulary, covering 33 orders of magnitude (10^{-15} to 10^{18}); and (2) a suffix-marker approach that uses a small set of special tokens to denote magnitude dynamically. Both variants preserve exact digits while making order-of-magnitude relationships transparent at the token level. The framework is inherently scalable, allowing for linear vocabulary expansion to accommodate arbitrary precision and range. TST is architecture-agnostic and can be integrated as a drop-in preprocessing step. Experimental validation is deferred to future work.

This paper introduces the counter-intuitive generalization results of overfitting pre-trained large language models (LLMs) on very small datasets. In the setting of open-ended text generation, it is well-documented that LLMs tend to generate repetitive and dull sequences, a phenomenon that is especially apparent when generating using greedy decoding. This issue persists even with state-of-the-art LLMs containing billions of parameters, trained via next-token prediction on large datasets. We find that by further fine-tuning these models to achieve a near-zero training loss on a small set of samples -- a process we refer to as hyperfitting -- the long-sequence generative capabilities are greatly enhanced. Greedy decoding with these Hyperfitted models even outperform Top-P sampling over long-sequences, both in terms of diversity and human preferences. This phenomenon extends to LLMs of various sizes, different domains, and even autoregressive image generation. We further find this phenomena to be distinctly different from that of Grokking and double descent. Surprisingly, our experiments indicate that hyperfitted models rarely fall into repeating sequences they were trained on, and even explicitly blocking these sequences results in high-quality output. All hyperfitted models produce extremely low-entropy predictions, often allocating nearly all probability to a single token.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models by incorporating external knowledge, addressing issues like outdated internal knowledge and hallucination. However, their reliance on external knowledge bases makes them vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks, where adversarial passages can be injected to manipulate retrieval results. Existing methods for crafting such passages, such as random token replacement or training inversion models, are often slow and computationally expensive, requiring either access to retriever's gradients or large computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose Dynamic Importance-Guided Genetic Algorithm (DIGA), an efficient black-box method that leverages two key properties of retrievers: insensitivity to token order and bias towards influential tokens. By focusing on these characteristics, DIGA dynamically adjusts its genetic operations to generate effective adversarial passages with significantly reduced time and memory usage. Our experimental evaluation shows that DIGA achieves superior efficiency and scalability compared to existing methods, while maintaining comparable or better attack success rates across multiple datasets.

Given an input sequence (or prefix), modern language models often assign high probabilities to output sequences that are repetitive, incoherent, or irrelevant to the prefix; as such, model-generated text also contains such artifacts. To address these issues we present RankGen, a 1.2B parameter encoder model for English that scores model generations given a prefix. RankGen can be flexibly incorporated as a scoring function in beam search and used to decode from any pretrained language model. We train RankGen using large-scale contrastive learning to map a prefix close to the ground-truth sequence that follows it and far away from two types of negatives: (1) random sequences from the same document as the prefix, and (2) sequences generated from a large language model conditioned on the prefix. Experiments across four different language models (345M-11B parameters) and two domains show that RankGen significantly outperforms decoding algorithms like nucleus, top-k, and typical sampling, as well as contrastive decoding and search, on both automatic metrics (85.0 vs 77.3 MAUVE over nucleus) as well as human evaluations with English writers (74.5% human preference over nucleus sampling). Analysis reveals that RankGen outputs are more relevant to the prefix and improve continuity and coherence compared to baselines. We release our model checkpoints, code, and human preference data with explanations to facilitate future research.

Machine unlearning aims to forget sensitive knowledge from Large Language Models (LLMs) while maintaining general utility. However, existing approaches typically treat all tokens in a response indiscriminately and enforce uncertainty over the entire vocabulary. This global treatment results in unnecessary utility degradation and extends optimization to content-agnostic regions. To address these limitations, we propose PALU (Prefix-Aware Localized Unlearning), a framework driven by a local entropy maximization objective across both temporal and vocabulary dimensions. PALU reveals that (i) suppressing the sensitive prefix alone is sufficient to sever the causal generation link, and (ii) flattening only the top-k logits is adequate to maximize uncertainty in the critical subspace. These findings allow PALU to avoid redundant optimization across the full vocabulary and parameter space while minimizing collateral damage to general model performance. Extensive experiments validate that PALU achieves superior forgetting efficacy and utility preservation compared to state-of-the-art baselines.

The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.

Accurately identifying adversarial techniques in security texts is critical for effective cyber defense. However, existing methods face a fundamental trade-off: they either rely on generic models with limited domain precision or require resource-intensive pipelines that depend on large labeled datasets and task-specific optimizations, such as custom hard-negative mining and denoising, resources rarely available in specialized domains. We propose TechniqueRAG, a domain-specific retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework that bridges this gap by integrating off-the-shelf retrievers, instruction-tuned LLMs, and minimal text-technique pairs. Our approach addresses data scarcity by fine-tuning only the generation component on limited in-domain examples, circumventing the need for resource-intensive retrieval training. While conventional RAG mitigates hallucination by coupling retrieval and generation, its reliance on generic retrievers often introduces noisy candidates, limiting domain-specific precision. To address this, we enhance retrieval quality and domain specificity through zero-shot LLM re-ranking, which explicitly aligns retrieved candidates with adversarial techniques. Experiments on multiple security benchmarks demonstrate that TechniqueRAG achieves state-of-the-art performance without extensive task-specific optimizations or labeled data, while comprehensive analysis provides further insights.

We propose the neural string edit distance model for string-pair matching and string transduction based on learnable string edit distance. We modify the original expectation-maximization learned edit distance algorithm into a differentiable loss function, allowing us to integrate it into a neural network providing a contextual representation of the input. We evaluate on cognate detection, transliteration, and grapheme-to-phoneme conversion, and show that we can trade off between performance and interpretability in a single framework. Using contextual representations, which are difficult to interpret, we match the performance of state-of-the-art string-pair matching models. Using static embeddings and a slightly different loss function, we force interpretability, at the expense of an accuracy drop.

Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) methods have become crucial for rapidly adapting large language models (LLMs) to downstream tasks. Prefix-Tuning, an early and effective PEFT technique, demonstrated the ability to achieve performance comparable to full fine-tuning with significantly reduced computational and memory overhead. However, despite its earlier success, its effectiveness in training modern state-of-the-art LLMs has been very limited. In this work, we demonstrate empirically that prefix-tuning underperforms on LLMs because of an inherent tradeoff between the contribution of the input prompt and the parameterized prefix within the attention head. This motivates us to introduce PrefixMemory-Tuning, an architecture that generalizes the principles of prefix-tuning while addressing its shortcomings by shifting the prefix module out of the attention head itself and improving its expressiveness. Our experiments show that, across diverse benchmarks, PrefixMemory-Tuning consistently outperforms existing prefix-tuning methods. Notably, it achieves competitive performance with modern PEFTs on several general benchmarks, highlighting a potential extension of prefix-tuning approaches to become state-of-the-art. Our findings suggest that by overcoming its inherent limitations, prefix-tuning can remain a competitive and relevant research direction in the landscape of parameter-efficient LLM adaptation.

This work presents LURK (Latent UnleaRned Knowledge), a novel framework that probes for hidden retained knowledge in unlearned LLMs through adversarial suffix prompting. LURK automatically generates adversarial prompt suffixes designed to elicit residual knowledge about the Harry Potter domain, a commonly used benchmark for unlearning. Our experiments reveal that even models deemed successfully unlearned can leak idiosyncratic information under targeted adversarial conditions, highlighting critical limitations of current unlearning evaluation standards. By uncovering latent knowledge through indirect probing, LURK offers a more rigorous and diagnostic tool for assessing the robustness of unlearning algorithms. All code will be publicly available.

Embedding models compress variable-length text into fixed-size vector representations, but this compression can entangle semantic content with residual token-level information, such as artifacts arising from attention sink behavior. We propose a simple method that prepends trainable [DUMP] tokens to the input during embedding model training. The method keeps the model architecture, pooling strategy, and training loss unchanged, while optimizing the added tokens through the standard contrastive retrieval objective. By introducing trainable prefix positions that interact with regular tokens during encoding, [DUMP] tokens help reduce the influence of residual or uninformative token-level signals on the final retrieval representation. Experiments on standard retrieval and long-context benchmarks show that our method consistently improves over finetuned baselines across encoder and decoder embedding models. Further analysis shows that [DUMP] tokens alter token-level activation and attention patterns associated with low-information tokens. These results suggest that trainable prefix tokens provide a lightweight way to improve retrieval representations.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have shown remarkable success in recent years, especially with pre-trained language models. However, deep neural models are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks may become a new type of web spamming technique given our increased reliance on neural information retrieval models. Therefore, it is important to study potential adversarial attacks to identify vulnerabilities of NRMs before they are deployed. In this paper, we introduce the Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) task against NRMs, which aims to promote a target document in rankings by adding adversarial perturbations to its text. We focus on the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers cannot directly get access to the model information, but can only query the target model to obtain the rank positions of the partial retrieved list. This attack setting is realistic in real-world search engines. We propose a novel Pseudo Relevance-based ADversarial ranking Attack method (PRADA) that learns a surrogate model based on Pseudo Relevance Feedback (PRF) to generate gradients for finding the adversarial perturbations. Experiments on two web search benchmark datasets show that PRADA can outperform existing attack strategies and successfully fool the NRM with small indiscernible perturbations of text.

In prompt tuning, a prefix or suffix text is added to the prompt, and the embeddings (soft prompts) or token indices (hard prompts) of the prefix/suffix are optimized to gain more control over language models for specific tasks. This approach eliminates the need for hand-crafted prompt engineering or explicit model fine-tuning. Prompt tuning is significantly more parameter-efficient than model fine-tuning, as it involves optimizing partial inputs of language models to produce desired outputs. In this work, we aim to further reduce the amount of trainable parameters required for a language model to perform well on specific tasks. We propose Low-rank Prompt Tuning (LoPT), a low-rank model for prompts that achieves efficient prompt optimization. The proposed method demonstrates similar outcomes to full parameter prompt tuning while reducing the number of trainable parameters by a factor of 5. It also provides promising results compared to the state-of-the-art methods that would require 10 to 20 times more parameters.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances LLM factuality, yet design guidance remains English-centric, limiting insights for morphologically rich languages like Turkish. We address this by constructing a comprehensive Turkish RAG dataset derived from Turkish Wikipedia and CulturaX, comprising question-answer pairs and relevant passage chunks. We benchmark seven stages of the RAG pipeline, from query transformation and reranking to answer refinement, without task-specific fine-tuning. Our results show that complex methods like HyDE maximize accuracy (85%) that is considerably higher than the baseline (78.70%). Also a Pareto-optimal configuration using Cross-encoder Reranking and Context Augmentation achieves comparable performance (84.60%) with much lower cost. We further demonstrate that over-stacking generative modules can degrade performance by distorting morphological cues, whereas simple query clarification with robust reranking offers an effective solution.

Large language models (LLMs) present significant deployment challenges due to their immense computational and memory requirements. While semi-structured pruning, particularly 2:4 sparsity, offers a path to practical hardware acceleration, existing methods often incur substantial performance degradation. To bridge this gap, we introduce ARMOR: (Adaptive Representation with Matrix-factORization), a novel one-shot post-training pruning algorithm. Instead of directly pruning weights, ARMOR factorizes each weight matrix into a 2:4 sparse core wrapped by two low-overhead, block diagonal matrices. These wrappers act as efficient pre and post-transformation error correctors, offering greater flexibility to preserve model quality compared to conventional 2:4 pruning techniques. The sparse core and block diagonal wrappers are chosen through a block coordinate descent algorithm that minimizes a layer-wise proxy loss. We theoretically prove this optimization is guaranteed to converge to a solution with a proxy loss less than or equal to state-of-the-art pruning algorithms. Experiments on Llama (Touvron et al., 2023; Dubey et al., 2024) and Qwen (Yang et al., 2025) model families demonstrate that ARMOR consistently and significantly outperforms state-of-the-art 2:4 pruning methods across a wide range of downstream tasks and perplexity evaluations. ARMOR achieves this superior performance while retaining the inference speedups and substantial memory usage reductions of 2:4 pruning, establishing a more effective trade-off between model compression and task accuracy

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) are central to modern information retrieval but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Existing attacks often rely on heuristics or surrogate models, limiting effectiveness and transferability. We propose CRAFT, a supervised framework for black-box adversarial rank attacks powered by large language models (LLMs). CRAFT operates in three stages: adversarial dataset generation via retrieval-augmented generation and self-refinement, supervised fine-tuning on curated adversarial examples, and preference-guided optimization to align generations with rank-promotion objectives. Extensive experiments on the MS MARCO passage dataset, TREC Deep Learning 2019, and TREC Deep Learning 2020 benchmarks show that CRAFT significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving higher promotion rates and rank boosts while preserving fluency and semantic fidelity. Moreover, CRAFT transfers effectively across diverse ranking architectures, including cross-encoder, embedding-based, and LLM-based rankers, underscoring vulnerabilities in real-world retrieval systems. This work provides a principled framework for studying adversarial threats in NRMs, underscores the risks of generative AI in rank manipulation, and provides a foundation for developing more robust retrieval systems. To support reproducibility, we publicly release our source code, trained models, and prompt templates.

The automatic detection of hypernymy relationships represents a challenging problem in NLP. The successful application of state-of-the-art supervised approaches using distributed representations has generally been impeded by the limited availability of high quality training data. We have developed two novel data augmentation techniques which generate new training examples from existing ones. First, we combine the linguistic principles of hypernym transitivity and intersective modifier-noun composition to generate additional pairs of vectors, such as "small dog - dog" or "small dog - animal", for which a hypernymy relationship can be assumed. Second, we use generative adversarial networks (GANs) to generate pairs of vectors for which the hypernymy relation can also be assumed. We furthermore present two complementary strategies for extending an existing dataset by leveraging linguistic resources such as WordNet. Using an evaluation across 3 different datasets for hypernymy detection and 2 different vector spaces, we demonstrate that both of the proposed automatic data augmentation and dataset extension strategies substantially improve classifier performance.

Recent work has developed optimization procedures to find token sequences, called adversarial triggers, which can elicit unsafe responses from aligned language models. These triggers are believed to be universally transferable, i.e., a trigger optimized on one model can jailbreak other models. In this paper, we concretely show that such adversarial triggers are not universal. We extensively investigate trigger transfer amongst 13 open models and observe inconsistent transfer. Our experiments further reveal a significant difference in robustness to adversarial triggers between models Aligned by Preference Optimization (APO) and models Aligned by Fine-Tuning (AFT). We find that APO models are extremely hard to jailbreak even when the trigger is optimized directly on the model. On the other hand, while AFT models may appear safe on the surface, exhibiting refusals to a range of unsafe instructions, we show that they are highly susceptible to adversarial triggers. Lastly, we observe that most triggers optimized on AFT models also generalize to new unsafe instructions from five diverse domains, further emphasizing their vulnerability. Overall, our work highlights the need for more comprehensive safety evaluations for aligned language models.

The pre-training of masked language models (MLMs) consumes massive computation to achieve good results on downstream NLP tasks, resulting in a large carbon footprint. In the vanilla MLM, the virtual tokens, [MASK]s, act as placeholders and gather the contextualized information from unmasked tokens to restore the corrupted information. It raises the question of whether we can append [MASK]s at a later layer, to reduce the sequence length for earlier layers and make the pre-training more efficient. We show: (1) [MASK]s can indeed be appended at a later layer, being disentangled from the word embedding; (2) The gathering of contextualized information from unmasked tokens can be conducted with a few layers. By further increasing the masking rate from 15% to 50%, we can pre-train RoBERTa-base and RoBERTa-large from scratch with only 78% and 68% of the original computational budget without any degradation on the GLUE benchmark. When pre-training with the original budget, our method outperforms RoBERTa for 6 out of 8 GLUE tasks, on average by 0.4%.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

Adversarial input attacks can cause a significant shift of CLIP embeddings. This can affect the downstream robustness of models incorporating CLIP in the pipeline, such as text-to-image generative models or large vision language models. While some efforts have been done towards making the CLIP image encoders robust, the robustness of text encoders remains unexplored. In this work, we cover this gap in the literature. We propose LEAF: an efficient adversarial finetuning method for the text domain, with the ability to scale to large CLIP models. Our models significantly improve the zero-shot adversarial accuracy in the text domain, while maintaining the vision performance provided by robust image encoders. When combined with text-to-image diffusion models, we can improve the generation quality under adversarial noise. When employing our robust CLIP encoders in multimodal retrieval tasks, we improve the recall under adversarial noise over standard CLIP models. Finally, we show that robust text encoders facilitate better reconstruction of input text from its embedding via direct optimization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across diverse tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, notably the well-known jailbreak attack. In particular, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack has demonstrated efficacy in exploiting this vulnerability by optimizing adversarial prompts through a combination of gradient heuristics and greedy search. However, the efficiency of this attack has become a bottleneck in the attacking process. To mitigate this limitation, in this paper we rethink the generation of the adversarial prompts through an optimization lens, aiming to stabilize the optimization process and harness more heuristic insights from previous optimization iterations. Specifically, we propose the Momentum Accelerated GCG (MAC) attack, which integrates a momentum term into the gradient heuristic to boost and stabilize the random search for tokens in adversarial prompts. Experimental results showcase the notable enhancement achieved by MAC over baselines in terms of attack success rate and optimization efficiency. Moreover, we demonstrate that MAC can still exhibit superior performance for transfer attacks and models under defense mechanisms. Our code is available at https://github.com/weizeming/momentum-attack-llm.

Recent work has demonstrated that using parameter efficient tuning techniques such as prefix tuning (or P-tuning) on pretrained language models can yield performance that is comparable or superior to fine-tuning while dramatically reducing trainable parameters. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such methods under the context of data augmentation, a common strategy to improve learning under low data regimes, has not been fully explored. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of several popular task-agnostic data augmentation techniques, i.e., EDA, Back Translation, and Mixup, when using two general parameter efficient tuning methods, P-tuning v2 and LoRA, under data scarcity. We show that data augmentation can be used to boost the performance of P-tuning and LoRA models, but the effectiveness of each technique varies and certain methods can lead to a notable degradation in performance, particularly when using larger models and on harder tasks. We further analyze the sentence representations of P-tuning compared to fine-tuning to help understand the above behaviour, and reveal how P-tuning generally presents a more limited ability to separate the sentence embeddings from different classes of augmented data. In addition, it displays poorer performance on heavily altered data. However, we demonstrate that by adding a simple contrastive loss function it can help mitigate such issues for prefix tuning, resulting in sizable improvements to augmented data performance.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Responses generated by neural conversational models tend to lack informativeness and diversity. We present Adversarial Information Maximization (AIM), an adversarial learning strategy that addresses these two related but distinct problems. To foster response diversity, we leverage adversarial training that allows distributional matching of synthetic and real responses. To improve informativeness, our framework explicitly optimizes a variational lower bound on pairwise mutual information between query and response. Empirical results from automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our methods significantly boost informativeness and diversity.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has emerged as a popular approach to steering the output of a large language model (LLM) by incorporating retrieved contexts as inputs. However, existing work observed the generator bias, such that improving the retrieval results may negatively affect the outcome. In this work, we show such bias can be mitigated, from inference scaling, aggregating inference calls from the permuted order of retrieved contexts. The proposed Mixture-of-Intervention (MOI) explicitly models the debiased utility of each passage with multiple forward passes to construct a new ranking. We also show that MOI can leverage the retriever's prior knowledge to reduce the computational cost by minimizing the number of permutations considered and lowering the cost per LLM call. We showcase the effectiveness of MOI on diverse RAG tasks, improving ROUGE-L on MS MARCO and EM on HotpotQA benchmarks by ~7 points.

We introduce a fast low-rank factorization-based framework for compressing large language models that enables rapid compression of billion-parameter models without retraining. Unlike existing factorization-based approaches that optimize only on the original inputs, ignoring distribution shifts from upstream compression and thus propagating errors forward, or those that rely only on shifted inputs and risk drifting away from the original outputs, our approach accounts for both. Beyond individual layer compression, we further refine each transformer block end-to-end, minimizing block-level output distortion and allowing compressed layers to jointly compensate for accumulated errors. By anchoring each compressed layer to the original outputs while explicitly modeling input distribution shifts, our method finds a low-rank approximation that maintains functional equivalence with the original model. Experiments on large language models show that our method consistently outperforms existing SVD-based baselines across compression ratios, with the advantage becoming increasingly pronounced at aggressive compression budgets, where competing methods degrade substantially or collapse entirely, offering a practical solution for efficient, large-scale model deployment.

As state-of-the-art machine translation models saturate standard benchmarks, the field needs more challenging evaluations to distinguish between models of varying quality. We propose augmenting existing benchmarks to increase translation difficulty by combining adversarial optimization with a differentiable translation difficulty estimator. Our Adversarial Translation Optimization (ATO) uses gradients from a combined difficulty and fluency objective to iteratively replace tokens. Because each step branches over candidate substitutions at every position, optimization becomes a tree search problem, which we address with Beam Search. ATO offers a gradient-based alternative to LLM-based dataset creation without LLM prompting, expensive human curation, or task-specific model training. Our ATO-modified benchmark lowers average translation quality (xCOMET) from 0.93 to 0.82, compared to 0.88 for paraphrasing and 0.86 for a zero-shot baseline. Human evaluation shows the modified texts are somewhat less natural than the baselines but remain reasonably grammatical and plausible while being substantially harder to translate. We release two datasets of 350 English texts each, generated by our methods, as well as the code.

Approaches for compressing large-language models using low-rank decomposition have made strides, particularly with the introduction of activation and loss-aware SVD, which improves the trade-off between decomposition rank and downstream task performance. Despite these advancements, a persistent challenge remains--selecting the optimal ranks for each layer to jointly optimise compression rate and downstream task accuracy. Current methods either rely on heuristics that can yield sub-optimal results due to their limited discrete search space or are gradient-based but are not as performant as heuristic approaches without post-compression fine-tuning. To address these issues, we propose Learning to Low-Rank Compress (LLRC), a gradient-based approach which directly learns the weights of masks that select singular values in a fine-tuning-free setting. Using a calibration dataset, we train only the mask weights to select fewer and fewer singular values while minimising the divergence of intermediate activations from the original model. Our approach outperforms competing ranking selection methods that similarly require no post-compression fine-tuning across various compression rates on common-sense reasoning and open-domain question-answering tasks. For instance, with a compression rate of 20% on Llama-2-13B, LLRC outperforms the competitive Sensitivity-based Truncation Rank Searching (STRS) on MMLU, BoolQ, and OpenbookQA by 12%, 3.5%, and 4.4%, respectively. Compared to other compression techniques, our approach consistently outperforms fine-tuning-free variants of SVD-LLM and LLM-Pruner across datasets and compression rates. Our fine-tuning-free approach also performs competitively with the fine-tuning variant of LLM-Pruner.

Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models designed to cause the model to make a mistake. They are useful for understanding the shortcomings of machine learning models, interpreting their results, and for regularisation. In NLP, however, most example generation strategies produce input text by using known, pre-specified semantic transformations, requiring significant manual effort and in-depth understanding of the problem and domain. In this paper, we investigate the problem of automatically generating adversarial examples that violate a set of given First-Order Logic constraints in Natural Language Inference (NLI). We reduce the problem of identifying such adversarial examples to a combinatorial optimisation problem, by maximising a quantity measuring the degree of violation of such constraints and by using a language model for generating linguistically-plausible examples. Furthermore, we propose a method for adversarially regularising neural NLI models for incorporating background knowledge. Our results show that, while the proposed method does not always improve results on the SNLI and MultiNLI datasets, it significantly and consistently increases the predictive accuracy on adversarially-crafted datasets -- up to a 79.6% relative improvement -- while drastically reducing the number of background knowledge violations. Furthermore, we show that adversarial examples transfer among model architectures, and that the proposed adversarial training procedure improves the robustness of NLI models to adversarial examples.

Large language models route every input through a learned embedding table of shape |V| x d_model, consuming hundreds of millions to billions of trainable parameters at frontier scale. We introduce Kronecker Embeddings, a deterministic byte-level character-position factorization that replaces this table with a fixed encoder and a single learned projection, compatible with standard BPE tokenizers, eliminating 91--94% of input-side trainable parameters at frontier scale. We provide five contributions. First, a cross-model probe across six LMs (135M-671B parameters) shows trained input embeddings cluster typographic variants of the probe word far more than morphological relatives; Kronecker escapes this clustering at the embedding layer. Second, a controlled three-seed comparison on nanoGPT GPT-2 124M over 2.5B tokens of FineWeb-Edu shows Kronecker reaching 2.5 +- 0.2% lower validation loss than the BPE-tied baseline (gap 0.083 +- 0.007 nats, ~9% lower perplexity), needing ~1.43x fewer steps to reach BPE's converged loss. Third, a spelling-robustness probe over 110 clean/typo pairs shows Kronecker preserves the top-1 prediction on 55.5% of pairs vs. 47.3% for BPE (+8.2 pp) and lowers KL by 7.6%, winning or tying in 10 of 11 categories; a generation probe shows Kronecker echoes byte-novel strings and typos through generation where BPE forgets them. Fourth, BPE embedding norm drifts during training while Kronecker projection norm stays near 1.0, consistent with a stable representational target. Fifth, an on-the-fly runtime variant reconstructs embeddings from a 4.5 MB byte buffer rather than a 2.15 GB table at vocabulary 131,072, with 0.01--0.24% step-time overhead. Byte-level locality has a tradeoff: byte-similar but semantically distant pairs (compute/commute, nation/notion) cluster together, shifting disambiguation to early attention layers.

We study the topmost weight matrix of neural network language models. We show that this matrix constitutes a valid word embedding. When training language models, we recommend tying the input embedding and this output embedding. We analyze the resulting update rules and show that the tied embedding evolves in a more similar way to the output embedding than to the input embedding in the untied model. We also offer a new method of regularizing the output embedding. Our methods lead to a significant reduction in perplexity, as we are able to show on a variety of neural network language models. Finally, we show that weight tying can reduce the size of neural translation models to less than half of their original size without harming their performance.

Diffusion Large Language Models (dLLMs) offer a compelling paradigm for natural language generation, leveraging parallel decoding and bidirectional attention to achieve superior global coherence compared to autoregressive models. While recent works have accelerated inference via KV cache reuse or heuristic decoding, they overlook the intrinsic inefficiencies within the block-wise diffusion process. Specifically, they suffer from spatial redundancy by modeling informative-sparse suffix regions uniformly and temporal inefficiency by applying fixed denoising schedules across all the decoding process. To address this, we propose Streaming-dLLM, a training-free framework that streamlines inference across both spatial and temporal dimensions. Spatially, we introduce attenuation guided suffix modeling to approximate the full context by pruning redundant mask tokens. Temporally, we employ a dynamic confidence aware strategy with an early exit mechanism, allowing the model to skip unnecessary iterations for converged tokens. Extensive experiments show that Streaming-dLLM achieves up to 68.2X speedup while maintaining generation quality, highlighting its effectiveness in diffusion decoding. The code is available at https://github.com/xiaoshideta/Streaming-dLLM.

Large language models can reproduce training data, but existing memorization evaluations mostly measure whether models can be forced to do so, rather than whether they do so under ordinary use. We introduce PropMe, a propensity-aware framework for memorization evaluation that contrasts prefix-based capability attacks with non-adversarial evaluations. We propose a metric transformation that, applied to existing functions, allows to create propensity metrics. We further introduce SimpleTrace, a lightweight tracing pipeline built on infini-gram that deterministically attributes model generations to large-scale training corpora and computes verbatim, near-verbatim, and propensity-transformed memorization metrics. Evaluating two fully-open models: Comma and DFM Decoder on two datasets: Common Pile and Dynaword in two languages, we find a consistent gap between capability and propensity: prefix attacks elicit substantially stronger memorization signals than generic or dataset-specific prompts, while propensity scores remain low overall. Thus, the models can reveal training data when directly elicited, but rarely do so in more common non-adversarial settings. We also find that DFM Decoder, which is continually pre-trained from Comma, exhibits reduced memorization and memorization propensity for Common Pile, confirming that memorization capability can decrease when later training emphasizes partially different data. Our results suggest, and we encourage, that memorization audits should report both worst-case extractability and ordinary leakage propensity in order to have a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon.

Hybrid LLMs interleave full-attention layers with linear-attention layers to reduce long-context inference cost, but this structure complicates prefix caching. Full-attention KV caches are token-addressable, whereas linear-attention layers maintain recurrent states that cannot be rolled back to arbitrary prefix boundaries. Existing systems materialize recurrent-state checkpoints, restricting prefix reuse to checkpoint-aligned positions. We present SuffixReplay, the first prefix caching system that lets hybrid LLMs reuse cached prefixes at every cache-supported page boundary without materializing recurrent-state checkpoints. Our key insight is to just let linear states forget the distant past. Modern linear-attention mechanisms use recurrent decay and gating to attenuate the influence of old inputs. Therefore, instead of checkpointing every prefix boundary, SuffixReplay approximates the state at a matched boundary by replaying only a recent suffix of the layer's input hidden states, which we retain as anchors. At the algorithmic level, SuffixReplay combines layer-wise and token-wise anchor sparsity with a bounded replay budget to control storage, computation, and quality. At the system level, it uses an independently managed anchor sidecar and a pipelined replay path to overlap anchor movement and state reconstruction with the native serving pipeline. We evaluate SuffixReplay on three hybrid LLMs: OLMo-Hybrid-7B, Qwen3.5-4B, and Qwen3.6-27B-FP8. Across these models, SuffixReplay retains 91.4-100% of full-prefill quality on average across LongBench and RULER, while using only 0.36-0.51x the amortized per-token storage of SGLang's default 8192-token checkpoint cache. Integrated into SGLang, SuffixReplay reduces median TTFT by 15-70% on branching workloads, sustains 2.3-4.3x SGLang's throughput when the working set exceeds HBM, and matches SGLang on high-hit continuation traffic.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing by unifying tasks into text generation, yet their large parameter sizes and autoregressive nature limit inference speed. SAM-Decoding addresses this by introducing a novel retrieval-based speculative decoding method that uses a suffix automaton for efficient and accurate draft generation. Unlike n-gram matching used by the existing method, SAM-Decoding finds the longest suffix match in generating text and text corpuss, achieving an average time complexity of O(1) per generation step. SAM-Decoding constructs static and dynamic suffix automatons for the text corpus and input prompts, respectively, enabling fast and precise draft generation. Meanwhile, it is designed as an approach that can be combined with existing methods, allowing SAM-Decoding to adaptively select a draft generation strategy based on the matching length, thus increasing the inference speed of the LLM. When combined with Token Recycling, evaluations show SAM-Decoding outperforms existing model-free methods, achieving a speedup of 2.27times over autoregressive decoding on Spec-Bench. When combined with EAGLE2, it reaches a speedup of 2.49times, surpassing all current approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/hyx1999/SAM-Decoding.

Despite the advancements in training Large Language Models (LLMs) with alignment techniques to enhance the safety of generated content, these models remain susceptible to jailbreak, an adversarial attack method that exposes security vulnerabilities in LLMs. Notably, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) method has demonstrated the ability to automatically generate adversarial suffixes that jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs. However, the optimization process involved in GCG is highly time-consuming, rendering the jailbreaking pipeline inefficient. In this paper, we investigate the process of GCG and identify an issue of Indirect Effect, the key bottleneck of the GCG optimization. To this end, we propose the Model Attack Gradient Index GCG (MAGIC), that addresses the Indirect Effect by exploiting the gradient information of the suffix tokens, thereby accelerating the procedure by having less computation and fewer iterations. Our experiments on AdvBench show that MAGIC achieves up to a 1.5x speedup, while maintaining Attack Success Rates (ASR) on par or even higher than other baselines. Our MAGIC achieved an ASR of 74% on the Llama-2 and an ASR of 54% when conducting transfer attacks on GPT-3.5. Code is available at https://github.com/jiah-li/magic.

Token embeddings, a mapping from discrete lexical symbols to continuous vectors, are at the heart of any language model (LM). However, lexical symbol meanings can also be determined and even redefined by their structural role in a long context. In this paper, we ask: is it possible for a language model to be performant without any fixed token embeddings? Such a language model would have to rely entirely on the co-occurence and repetition of tokens in the context rather than the a priori identity of any token. To answer this, we study lexinvariantlanguage models that are invariant to lexical symbols and therefore do not need fixed token embeddings in practice. First, we prove that we can construct a lexinvariant LM to converge to the true language model at a uniform rate that is polynomial in terms of the context length, with a constant factor that is sublinear in the vocabulary size. Second, to build a lexinvariant LM, we simply encode tokens using random Gaussian vectors, such that each token maps to the same representation within each sequence but different representations across sequences. Empirically, we demonstrate that it can indeed attain perplexity comparable to that of a standard language model, given a sufficiently long context. We further explore two properties of the lexinvariant language models: First, given text generated from a substitution cipher of English, it implicitly implements Bayesian in-context deciphering and infers the mapping to the underlying real tokens with high accuracy. Second, it has on average 4X better accuracy over synthetic in-context reasoning tasks. Finally, we discuss regularizing standard language models towards lexinvariance and potential practical applications.

A range of recent works addresses the problem of compression of sequence of tokens into a shorter sequence of real-valued vectors to be used as inputs instead of token embeddings or key-value cache. These approaches allow to reduce the amount of compute in existing language models. Despite relying on powerful models as encoders, the maximum attainable lossless compression ratio is typically not higher than x10. This fact is highly intriguing because, in theory, the maximum information capacity of large real-valued vectors is far beyond the presented rates even for 16-bit precision and a modest vector size. In this work, we explore the limits of compression by replacing the encoder with a per-sample optimization procedure. We show that vectors with compression ratios up to x1500 exist, which highlights two orders of magnitude gap between existing and practically attainable solutions. Furthermore, we empirically show that the compression limits are determined not by the length of the input but by the amount of uncertainty to be reduced, namely, the cross-entropy loss on this sequence without any conditioning. The obtained limits highlight the substantial gap between the theoretical capacity of input embeddings and their practical utilization, suggesting significant room for optimization in model design.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) become ever more dominant, classic pre-trained word embeddings sustain their relevance through computational efficiency and nuanced linguistic interpretation. Drawing from recent studies demonstrating that the convergence of GloVe and word2vec optimizations all tend towards log-co-occurrence matrix variants, we construct a novel word representation system called Bit-cipher that eliminates the need of backpropagation while leveraging contextual information and hyper-efficient dimensionality reduction techniques based on unigram frequency, providing strong interpretability, alongside efficiency. We use the bit-cipher algorithm to train word vectors via a two-step process that critically relies on a hyperparameter -- bits -- that controls the vector dimension. While the first step trains the bit-cipher, the second utilizes it under two different aggregation modes -- summation or concatenation -- to produce contextually rich representations from word co-occurrences. We extend our investigation into bit-cipher's efficacy, performing probing experiments on part-of-speech (POS) tagging and named entity recognition (NER) to assess its competitiveness with classic embeddings like word2vec and GloVe. Additionally, we explore its applicability in LM training and fine-tuning. By replacing embedding layers with cipher embeddings, our experiments illustrate the notable efficiency of cipher in accelerating the training process and attaining better optima compared to conventional training paradigms. Experiments on the integration of bit-cipher embedding layers with Roberta, T5, and OPT, prior to or as a substitute for fine-tuning, showcase a promising enhancement to transfer learning, allowing rapid model convergence while preserving competitive performance.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

In this paper, we study the problem of generating obstinate (over-stability) adversarial examples by word substitution in NLP, where input text is meaningfully changed but the model's prediction does not, even though it should. Previous word substitution approaches have predominantly focused on manually designed antonym-based strategies for generating obstinate adversarial examples, which hinders its application as these strategies can only find a subset of obstinate adversarial examples and require human efforts. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a novel word substitution method named GradObstinate, a gradient-based approach that automatically generates obstinate adversarial examples without any constraints on the search space or the need for manual design principles. To empirically evaluate the efficacy of GradObstinate, we conduct comprehensive experiments on five representative models (Electra, ALBERT, Roberta, DistillBERT, and CLIP) finetuned on four NLP benchmarks (SST-2, MRPC, SNLI, and SQuAD) and a language-grounding benchmark (MSCOCO). Extensive experiments show that our proposed GradObstinate generates more powerful obstinate adversarial examples, exhibiting a higher attack success rate compared to antonym-based methods. Furthermore, to show the transferability of obstinate word substitutions found by GradObstinate, we replace the words in four representative NLP benchmarks with their obstinate substitutions. Notably, obstinate substitutions exhibit a high success rate when transferred to other models in black-box settings, including even GPT-3 and ChatGPT. Examples of obstinate adversarial examples found by GradObstinate are available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/anonauthors/SecretLanguage.

Current dense text retrieval models face two typical challenges. First, they adopt a siamese dual-encoder architecture to encode queries and documents independently for fast indexing and searching, while neglecting the finer-grained term-wise interactions. This results in a sub-optimal recall performance. Second, their model training highly relies on a negative sampling technique to build up the negative documents in their contrastive losses. To address these challenges, we present Adversarial Retriever-Ranker (AR2), which consists of a dual-encoder retriever plus a cross-encoder ranker. The two models are jointly optimized according to a minimax adversarial objective: the retriever learns to retrieve negative documents to cheat the ranker, while the ranker learns to rank a collection of candidates including both the ground-truth and the retrieved ones, as well as providing progressive direct feedback to the dual-encoder retriever. Through this adversarial game, the retriever gradually produces harder negative documents to train a better ranker, whereas the cross-encoder ranker provides progressive feedback to improve retriever. We evaluate AR2 on three benchmarks. Experimental results show that AR2 consistently and significantly outperforms existing dense retriever methods and achieves new state-of-the-art results on all of them. This includes the improvements on Natural Questions R@5 to 77.9%(+2.1%), TriviaQA R@5 to 78.2%(+1.4), and MS-MARCO MRR@10 to 39.5%(+1.3%). Code and models are available at https://github.com/microsoft/AR2.

Recent alignment studies commonly remove introductory boilerplate phrases from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) datasets. This work challenges that assumption. We hypothesize that safety- and reasoning-oriented prefix sentences serve as lightweight alignment signals that can guide model decoding toward safer and more coherent responses. To examine this, we fine-tune three R1 series models across three core model capabilities: reasoning (mathematics, coding), safety, and factuality, systematically varying prefix inclusion from 0% to 100%. Results show that prefix-conditioned SFT improves both safety and reasoning performance, yielding up to +6% higher Safe@1 accuracy on adversarial benchmarks (WildJailbreak, StrongReject) and +7% improvement on GSM8K reasoning. However, factuality and coding tasks show marginal or negative effects, indicating that prefix-induced narrowing of the search space benefits structured reasoning. Token-level loss analysis further reveals that prefix tokens such as "revised" and "logically" incur higher gradient magnitudes, acting as alignment anchors that stabilize reasoning trajectories. Our findings suggest that prefix conditioning offers a scalable and interpretable mechanism for improving reasoning safety, serving as an implicit form of alignment that complements traditional reward-based methods.

The evolving sophistication and intricacies of Large Language Models (LLMs) yield unprecedented advancements, yet they simultaneously demand considerable computational resources and incur significant costs. To alleviate these challenges, this paper introduces a novel, simple, and effective method named ``\growlength'' to accelerate the pretraining process of LLMs. Our method progressively increases the training length throughout the pretraining phase, thereby mitigating computational costs and enhancing efficiency. For instance, it begins with a sequence length of 128 and progressively extends to 4096. This approach enables models to process a larger number of tokens within limited time frames, potentially boosting their performance. In other words, the efficiency gain is derived from training with shorter sequences optimizing the utilization of resources. Our extensive experiments with various state-of-the-art LLMs have revealed that models trained using our method not only converge more swiftly but also exhibit superior performance metrics compared to those trained with existing methods. Furthermore, our method for LLMs pretraining acceleration does not require any additional engineering efforts, making it a practical solution in the realm of LLMs.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge, but its openness introduces vulnerabilities that can be exploited by poisoning attacks. Existing poisoning methods for RAG systems have limitations, such as poor generalization and lack of fluency in adversarial texts. In this paper, we propose CPA-RAG, a black-box adversarial framework that generates query-relevant texts capable of manipulating the retrieval process to induce target answers. The proposed method integrates prompt-based text generation, cross-guided optimization through multiple LLMs, and retriever-based scoring to construct high-quality adversarial samples. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple datasets and LLMs to evaluate its effectiveness. Results show that the framework achieves over 90\% attack success when the top-k retrieval setting is 5, matching white-box performance, and maintains a consistent advantage of approximately 5 percentage points across different top-k values. It also outperforms existing black-box baselines by 14.5 percentage points under various defense strategies. Furthermore, our method successfully compromises a commercial RAG system deployed on Alibaba's BaiLian platform, demonstrating its practical threat in real-world applications. These findings underscore the need for more robust and secure RAG frameworks to defend against poisoning attacks.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) empowers large language models (LLMs) to utilize external knowledge sources. The increasing capacity of LLMs to process longer input sequences opens up avenues for providing more retrieved information, to potentially enhance the quality of generated outputs. It is plausible to assume that a larger retrieval set would contain more relevant information (higher recall), that might result in improved performance. However, our empirical findings demonstrate that for many long-context LLMs, the quality of generated output initially improves first, but then subsequently declines as the number of retrieved passages increases. This paper investigates this phenomenon, identifying the detrimental impact of retrieved "hard negatives" as a key contributor. To mitigate this and enhance the robustness of long-context LLM-based RAG, we propose both training-free and training-based approaches. We first showcase the effectiveness of retrieval reordering as a simple yet powerful training-free optimization. Furthermore, we explore training-based methods, specifically RAG-specific implicit LLM fine-tuning and RAG-oriented fine-tuning with intermediate reasoning, demonstrating their capacity for substantial performance gains. Finally, we conduct a systematic analysis of design choices for these training-based methods, including data distribution, retriever selection, and training context length.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) has raised security concerns due to their susceptibility to producing harmful or policy-violating outputs when exposed to adversarial prompts. While alignment and guardrails mitigate common misuse, they remain vulnerable to automated jailbreaking methods such as GCG, PEZ, and GBDA, which generate adversarial suffixes via training and gradient-based search. Although effective, these methods particularly GCG are computationally expensive, limiting their practicality for organisations with constrained resources. This paper introduces a resource-efficient adversarial prompting approach that eliminates the need for retraining by matching new prompts to a database of pre-trained adversarial prompts. A dataset of 1,000 prompts was classified into seven harm-related categories, and GCG, PEZ, and GBDA were evaluated on a Llama 3 8B model to identify the most effective attack method per category. Results reveal a correlation between prompt type and algorithm effectiveness. By retrieving semantically similar successful adversarial prompts, the proposed method achieves competitive attack success rates with significantly reduced computational cost. This work provides a practical framework for scalable red-teaming and security evaluation of aligned LLMs, including in settings where model internals are inaccessible.

Modern reasoning models continue generating long after the answer is already determined. Across five model configurations, two families, and three benchmarks, we find that 52--88\% of chain-of-thought tokens are produced after the answer is recoverable from a partial prefix. This post-commitment generation reveals a structural phenomenon: the detection--extraction gap. Free continuations from early prefixes recover the correct answer even at 10\% of the trace, while forced extraction fails on 42\% of these cases. The answer is recoverable from the model state, yet prompt-conditioned decoding fails to extract it. We formalize this mismatch via a total-variation bound between free and forced continuation distributions, yielding quantitative estimates of suffix-induced shift. Exploiting this asymmetry, we propose Black-box Adaptive Early Exit (), which uses free continuations for both detection and extraction, truncating 70--78\% of serial generation while improving accuracy by 1--5\,pp across all models. For thinking-mode models, early exit prevents post-commitment overwriting, yielding gains of up to 5.8\,pp; a cost-optimized variant achieves 68--73\% reduction at a median of 9 API calls. Code is available at https://github.com/EdWangLoDaSc/know2say.

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

In this paper, we explore the idea of training large language models (LLMs) over highly compressed text. While standard subword tokenizers compress text by a small factor, neural text compressors can achieve much higher rates of compression. If it were possible to train LLMs directly over neurally compressed text, this would confer advantages in training and serving efficiency, as well as easier handling of long text spans. The main obstacle to this goal is that strong compression tends to produce opaque outputs that are not well-suited for learning. In particular, we find that text na\"ively compressed via Arithmetic Coding is not readily learnable by LLMs. To overcome this, we propose Equal-Info Windows, a novel compression technique whereby text is segmented into blocks that each compress to the same bit length. Using this method, we demonstrate effective learning over neurally compressed text that improves with scale, and outperforms byte-level baselines by a wide margin on perplexity and inference speed benchmarks. While our method delivers worse perplexity than subword tokenizers for models trained with the same parameter count, it has the benefit of shorter sequence lengths. Shorter sequence lengths require fewer autoregressive generation steps, and reduce latency. Finally, we provide extensive analysis of the properties that contribute to learnability, and offer concrete suggestions for how to further improve the performance of high-compression tokenizers.

Recent dynamic tokenisation methods operate directly on bytes and pool their latent representations into patches. This bears similarities to computational models of word segmentation that determine lexical boundaries using spikes in an autoregressive model's prediction error. Inspired by this connection, we explore whether grouping predictable bytes - rather than pooling their representations - can yield a useful fixed subword vocabulary. We propose a new information-driven subword tokeniser, ByteSpan, that uses an external byte-level LM during training to identify contiguous predictable byte sequences and group them into subwords. Experiments show that ByteSpan yields efficient vocabularies with higher morphological alignment scores than BPE for English. Multilingual experiments show similar compression and R\'enyi efficiency for 25 languages.

Neural text ranking models have witnessed significant advancement and are increasingly being deployed in practice. Unfortunately, they also inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural models, which have been detected but remain underexplored by prior studies. Moreover, the inherit adversarial vulnerabilities might be leveraged by blackhat SEO to defeat better-protected search engines. In this study, we propose an imitation adversarial attack on black-box neural passage ranking models. We first show that the target passage ranking model can be transparentized and imitated by enumerating critical queries/candidates and then train a ranking imitation model. Leveraging the ranking imitation model, we can elaborately manipulate the ranking results and transfer the manipulation attack to the target ranking model. For this purpose, we propose an innovative gradient-based attack method, empowered by the pairwise objective function, to generate adversarial triggers, which causes premeditated disorderliness with very few tokens. To equip the trigger camouflages, we add the next sentence prediction loss and the language model fluency constraint to the objective function. Experimental results on passage ranking demonstrate the effectiveness of the ranking imitation attack model and adversarial triggers against various SOTA neural ranking models. Furthermore, various mitigation analyses and human evaluation show the effectiveness of camouflages when facing potential mitigation approaches. To motivate other scholars to further investigate this novel and important problem, we make the experiment data and code publicly available.

Adversarial training provides a means of regularizing supervised learning algorithms while virtual adversarial training is able to extend supervised learning algorithms to the semi-supervised setting. However, both methods require making small perturbations to numerous entries of the input vector, which is inappropriate for sparse high-dimensional inputs such as one-hot word representations. We extend adversarial and virtual adversarial training to the text domain by applying perturbations to the word embeddings in a recurrent neural network rather than to the original input itself. The proposed method achieves state of the art results on multiple benchmark semi-supervised and purely supervised tasks. We provide visualizations and analysis showing that the learned word embeddings have improved in quality and that while training, the model is less prone to overfitting. Code is available at https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/adversarial_text.

Dense retrievers have achieved state-of-the-art performance in various information retrieval tasks, but to what extent can they be safely deployed in real-world applications? In this work, we propose a novel attack for dense retrieval systems in which a malicious user generates a small number of adversarial passages by perturbing discrete tokens to maximize similarity with a provided set of training queries. When these adversarial passages are inserted into a large retrieval corpus, we show that this attack is highly effective in fooling these systems to retrieve them for queries that were not seen by the attacker. More surprisingly, these adversarial passages can directly generalize to out-of-domain queries and corpora with a high success attack rate -- for instance, we find that 50 generated passages optimized on Natural Questions can mislead >94% of questions posed in financial documents or online forums. We also benchmark and compare a range of state-of-the-art dense retrievers, both unsupervised and supervised. Although different systems exhibit varying levels of vulnerability, we show they can all be successfully attacked by injecting up to 500 passages, a small fraction compared to a retrieval corpus of millions of passages.

Speculative decoding accelerates autoregressive generation by verifying a draft block with a target model in parallel. Under standard greedy verification, decoding stops at the first draft token that differs from the target argmax, discarding the remaining target-scored suffix. Although accepting such a mismatch changes the decoding trajectory, it can make a contiguous suffix reusable when its tokens remain target-greedy under the realized prefix. In this paper, we introduce Approximate Speculative Decoding (ASD), a training-free verifier that replaces binary first-mismatch truncation with budgeted longest-prefix selection. ASD accepts selected mismatches subject to a local target-logit regret gate, a per-block exception cap, and a persistent request-level regret budget, then reuses the contiguous target-greedy suffix without additional approximate decisions or target-model forward passes. ASD requires neither a new draft model nor fine-tuning, and exactly reduces to standard greedy verification when the budget is zero. Experiments show that ASD improves fixed-workload throughput by 3.05%--15.26% over matched strict verification and averages a 7.78% gain across seven Qwen3-14B + DSpark-14B tasks. On DeepSeek-V4-Flash (284B) with DSpark it also raises verifier-side acceptance by roughly 10%--16% on GSM8K and MATH-500 in an FP4-to-FP8 compatibility setting. The source code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Kissmetothemoon/ASD

Most existing work on adversarial data generation focuses on English. For example, PAWS (Paraphrase Adversaries from Word Scrambling) consists of challenging English paraphrase identification pairs from Wikipedia and Quora. We remedy this gap with PAWS-X, a new dataset of 23,659 human translated PAWS evaluation pairs in six typologically distinct languages: French, Spanish, German, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. We provide baseline numbers for three models with different capacity to capture non-local context and sentence structure, and using different multilingual training and evaluation regimes. Multilingual BERT fine-tuned on PAWS English plus machine-translated data performs the best, with a range of 83.1-90.8 accuracy across the non-English languages and an average accuracy gain of 23% over the next best model. PAWS-X shows the effectiveness of deep, multilingual pre-training while also leaving considerable headroom as a new challenge to drive multilingual research that better captures structure and contextual information.

Large language models are typically trained under uniform token weighting, which allows frequent and low-information tokens to dominate learning and can increase the tendency to memorize surface-level text spans. To address this, we present an information-weighted cross-entropy loss that rescales token-level contributions using TF-IDF statistics, emphasizing semantically informative tokens while down-weighting ubiquitous ones. Experiments on five decoder-only LLMs ranging from 1.1B to 13B parameters show consistent reductions in memorized substring length while preserving perplexity and downstream task performance. Under LoRA fine-tuning, TF-IDF reduces average substring memorization length by 14% across all five models. Under full-weight fine-tuning on TinyLLaMA 1.1B, the reduction reaches 58%. Our approach is architecture-agnostic and can be incorporated into existing training pipelines with less than 3% computational overhead, offering a lightweight and principled way to mitigate memorization without disrupting standard training dynamics.

Recent years have witnessed remarkable progress made in large language models (LLMs). Such advancements, while garnering significant attention, have concurrently elicited various concerns. The potential of these models is undeniably vast; however, they may yield texts that are imprecise, misleading, or even detrimental. Consequently, it becomes paramount to employ alignment techniques to ensure these models to exhibit behaviors consistent with human values. This survey endeavors to furnish an extensive exploration of alignment methodologies designed for LLMs, in conjunction with the extant capability research in this domain. Adopting the lens of AI alignment, we categorize the prevailing methods and emergent proposals for the alignment of LLMs into outer and inner alignment. We also probe into salient issues including the models' interpretability, and potential vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. To assess LLM alignment, we present a wide variety of benchmarks and evaluation methodologies. After discussing the state of alignment research for LLMs, we finally cast a vision toward the future, contemplating the promising avenues of research that lie ahead. Our aspiration for this survey extends beyond merely spurring research interests in this realm. We also envision bridging the gap between the AI alignment research community and the researchers engrossed in the capability exploration of LLMs for both capable and safe LLMs.

Masked Language Modeling (MLM) has been one of the most prominent approaches for pretraining bidirectional text encoders due to its simplicity and effectiveness. One notable concern about MLM is that the special [MASK] symbol causes a discrepancy between pretraining data and downstream data as it is present only in pretraining but not in fine-tuning. In this work, we offer a new perspective on the consequence of such a discrepancy: We demonstrate empirically and theoretically that MLM pretraining allocates some model dimensions exclusively for representing [MASK] tokens, resulting in a representation deficiency for real tokens and limiting the pretrained model's expressiveness when it is adapted to downstream data without [MASK] tokens. Motivated by the identified issue, we propose MAE-LM, which pretrains the Masked Autoencoder architecture with MLM where [MASK] tokens are excluded from the encoder. Empirically, we show that MAE-LM improves the utilization of model dimensions for real token representations, and MAE-LM consistently outperforms MLM-pretrained models across different pretraining settings and model sizes when fine-tuned on the GLUE and SQuAD benchmarks.

Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real. We present AdversaBench, an end-to-end red-teaming pipeline that mutates seed prompts with five structured operators, queries a target model, and confirms failures through a three-judge panel with a meta-judge tiebreaker. We report experiments on 45 seeds across three categories: reasoning, instruction-following, and tool use. Every seed produced a confirmed failure. Four findings stand out. First, operator effectiveness varies sharply by category: inject_distractor scores 0.00 mean reward on instruction-following seeds but 0.80-0.83 on reasoning and tool-use. Second, binary failure rate hides difficulty: instruction-following seeds required 2.4 attacker iterations on average versus 1.1 for other categories, a gap visible in survival curves. Third, pairwise judge agreement of 80-87% coexists with near-zero Cohen's kappa due to label skew; category-level disagreement rates are more informative. Fourth, adversarial prompts generated against Llama 3.1 8B transfer zero-shot to Llama 3.3 70B, suggesting the mutations exploit general behavioral patterns rather than model-specific weaknesses. Code, dataset, and analysis scripts are available at https://github.com/khanak0509/AdversaBench .

Discovering the existence of universal adversarial perturbations had large theoretical and practical impacts on the field of adversarial learning. In the text domain, most universal studies focused on adversarial prefixes which are added to all texts. However, unlike the vision domain, adding the same perturbation to different inputs results in noticeably unnatural inputs. Therefore, we introduce a new universal adversarial setup - a universal adversarial policy, which has many advantages of other universal attacks but also results in valid texts - thus making it relevant in practice. We achieve this by learning a single search policy over a predefined set of semantics preserving text alterations, on many texts. This formulation is universal in that the policy is successful in finding adversarial examples on new texts efficiently. Our approach uses text perturbations which were extensively shown to produce natural attacks in the non-universal setup (specific synonym replacements). We suggest a strong baseline approach for this formulation which uses reinforcement learning. It's ability to generalise (from as few as 500 training texts) shows that universal adversarial patterns exist in the text domain as well.

In this work, we explore "prompt tuning", a simple yet effective mechanism for learning "soft prompts" to condition frozen language models to perform specific downstream tasks. Unlike the discrete text prompts used by GPT-3, soft prompts are learned through backpropagation and can be tuned to incorporate signal from any number of labeled examples. Our end-to-end learned approach outperforms GPT-3's "few-shot" learning by a large margin. More remarkably, through ablations on model size using T5, we show that prompt tuning becomes more competitive with scale: as models exceed billions of parameters, our method "closes the gap" and matches the strong performance of model tuning (where all model weights are tuned). This finding is especially relevant in that large models are costly to share and serve, and the ability to reuse one frozen model for multiple downstream tasks can ease this burden. Our method can be seen as a simplification of the recently proposed "prefix tuning" of Li and Liang (2021), and we provide a comparison to this and other similar approaches. Finally, we show that conditioning a frozen model with soft prompts confers benefits in robustness to domain transfer, as compared to full model tuning.

We identify a previously overlooked failure mode of ALiBi positional encoding: its linear bias scaling underflows floating-point precision, which zeroes out a large fraction of attention weights and renders the affected attention heads partially blind. We analyze this failure mode, characterize its impact, and examine four mitigation strategies. We further demonstrate its occurrence in state-of-the-art pretrained models based on ALiBi. Comprehensive pretraining experiments with 148M-parameter decoder models help us to disentangle its effects from out-of-context degradation. We find that ALiBi's failure mode can substantially impair token retrieval while having only a minor effect on standard decoder benchmarks. We propose four training-time mitigation strategies and evaluate them individually and in combinations, finding that log-scaled distances yield the most consistent improvements in passkey retrieval. Despite this problem, default ALiBi slopes remain a surprisingly strong baseline, particularly for needle-in-a-haystack retrieval. Based on these findings we provide concrete recommendations on how to train models with ALiBi.

Text classification systems have been proven vulnerable to adversarial text examples, modified versions of the original text examples that are often unnoticed by human eyes, yet can force text classification models to alter their classification. Often, research works quantifying the impact of adversarial text attacks have been applied only to models trained in English. In this paper, we introduce the first word-level study of adversarial attacks in Arabic. Specifically, we use a synonym (word-level) attack using a Masked Language Modeling (MLM) task with a BERT model in a black-box setting to assess the robustness of the state-of-the-art text classification models to adversarial attacks in Arabic. To evaluate the grammatical and semantic similarities of the newly produced adversarial examples using our synonym BERT-based attack, we invite four human evaluators to assess and compare the produced adversarial examples with their original examples. We also study the transferability of these newly produced Arabic adversarial examples to various models and investigate the effectiveness of defense mechanisms against these adversarial examples on the BERT models. We find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to our synonym attacks than the other Deep Neural Networks (DNN) models like WordCNN and WordLSTM we trained. We also find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to transferred attacks. We, lastly, find that fine-tuned BERT models successfully regain at least 2% in accuracy after applying adversarial training as an initial defense mechanism.

We revisit a universally accepted but under-examined design choice in every modern LLM: a token index is looked up once at the input embedding layer and then permanently discarded. This single-injection assumption induces two structural failures: (i) the Rare Token Problem, where a Zipf-type distribution of vocabulary causes rare-token embeddings are chronically under-trained due to receiving a fraction of the cumulative gradient signal compared to common tokens; and (ii) the Contextual Collapse Problem, where limited parameters models map distributionally similar tokens to indistinguishable hidden states. As an attempt to address both, we propose TIDE, which augments the standard transformer with EmbeddingMemory: an ensemble of K independent MemoryBlocks that map token indices to context-free semantic vectors, computed once and injected into every layer through a depth-conditioned softmax router with a learnable null bank. We theoretically and empirically establish the benefits of TIDE in addressing the issues associated with single-token identity injection as well as improve performance across multiple language modeling and downstream tasks.

Test-Time Scaling (TTS) improves the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) by allocating additional compute during inference. We conduct a structured survey of TTS methods and categorize them into sampling-based, search-based, and trajectory optimization strategies. We observe that reasoning-optimized models often produce less diverse outputs, which limits TTS effectiveness. To address this, we propose ADAPT (A Diversity Aware Prefix fine-Tuning), a lightweight method that applies prefix tuning with a diversity-focused data strategy. Experiments on mathematical reasoning tasks show that ADAPT reaches 80% accuracy using eight times less compute than strong baselines. Our findings highlight the essential role of generative diversity in maximizing TTS effectiveness.

In large language model training, input documents are typically concatenated together and then split into sequences of equal length to avoid padding tokens. Despite its efficiency, the concatenation approach compromises data integrity -- it inevitably breaks many documents into incomplete pieces, leading to excessive truncations that hinder the model from learning to compose logically coherent and factually consistent content that is grounded on the complete context. To address the issue, we propose Best-fit Packing, a scalable and efficient method that packs documents into training sequences through length-aware combinatorial optimization. Our method completely eliminates unnecessary truncations while retaining the same training efficiency as concatenation. Empirical results from both text and code pre-training show that our method achieves superior performance (e.g., relatively +4.7% on reading comprehension; +16.8% in context following; and +9.2% on program synthesis), and reduces closed-domain hallucination effectively by up to 58.3%.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Current open-weight large language models (LLMs) are prone to malicious finetuning attacks, which could compromise the safety alignment of LLMs with only a few steps of supervised finetuning (SFT) on poisoned datasets. Existing alignment-stage defenses are primarily designed to defend against attacks that use parameter-efficient finetuning methods. However, they fail to defend against stronger attacks that use full-parameter finetuning. In this paper, we propose Patcher, a method inspired by adversarial training and bi-level optimization, to combat such attacks. Patcher strengthens the simulated attack by scaling up the optimization steps in the adversarial loop, thus forcing the defender to find model parameters that are insensitive to stronger attacks. Furthermore, we propose an efficient parallel algorithm to implement Patcher, decreasing the wall-clock time of training while preserving Patcher's performance. Extensive experiments show that Patcher substantially improves the model's robustness compared to vanilla SFT alignment, and transfers to diverse attack scenarios and model sizes. Code is available at https://github.com/haomingwen/patcher.

We propose Self-Control, a novel method utilizing suffix gradients to control the behavior of large language models (LLMs) without explicit human annotations. Given a guideline expressed in suffix string and the model's self-assessment of adherence, Self-Control computes the gradient of this self-judgment concerning the model's hidden states, directly influencing the auto-regressive generation process towards desired behaviors. To enhance efficiency, we introduce Self-Control_{prefix}, a compact module that encapsulates the learned representations from suffix gradients into a Prefix Controller, facilitating inference-time control for various LLM behaviors. Our experiments demonstrate Self-Control's efficacy across multiple domains, including emotional modulation, ensuring harmlessness, and enhancing complex reasoning. Especially, Self-Control_{prefix} enables a plug-and-play control and jointly controls multiple attributes, improving model outputs without altering model parameters or increasing inference-time costs.

Despite advances in AI alignment, language models (LM) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks or jailbreaking, in which adversaries modify input prompts to induce harmful behavior. While some defenses have been proposed, they focus on narrow threat models and fall short of a strong defense, which we posit should be effective, universal, and practical. To achieve this, we propose the first adversarial objective for defending LMs against jailbreaking attacks and an algorithm, robust prompt optimization (RPO), that uses gradient-based token optimization to enforce harmless outputs. This results in an easily accessible suffix that significantly improves robustness to both jailbreaks seen during optimization and unknown, held-out jailbreaks, reducing the attack success rate on Starling-7B from 84% to 8.66% across 20 jailbreaks. In addition, we find that RPO has a minor effect on normal LM use, is successful under adaptive attacks, and can transfer to black-box models, reducing the success rate of the strongest attack on GPT-4 from 92% to 6%.

Effective training of today's large language models (LLMs) depends on large batches and long sequences for throughput and accuracy. To handle variable-length sequences on hardware accelerators, it is common practice to introduce padding tokens, so that all sequences in a batch have the same length. We show in this paper that the variation in sequence lengths in common NLP datasets is such that up to 50% of all tokens can be padding. In less common, but not extreme, cases (e.g. GLUE-cola with sequence length 128), the ratio is up to 89%. Existing methods to address the resulting inefficiency are complicated by the need to avoid cross-contamination in self-attention, by a reduction in accuracy when sequence ordering information is lost, or by customized kernel implementations only valid for specific accelerators. This paper introduces a new formalization of sequence packing in the context of the well-studied bin packing problem, and presents new algorithms based on this formulation which, for example, confer a 2x speedup for phase 2 pre-training in BERT. We show how existing models can be adapted to ensure mathematical equivalence between the original and packed models, meaning that packed models can be trained with existing pre-training and fine-tuning practices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved significant success across various NLP tasks. However, their massive computational costs limit their widespread use, particularly in real-time applications. Structured pruning offers an effective solution by compressing models and directly providing end-to-end speed improvements, regardless of the hardware environment. Meanwhile, different components of the model exhibit varying sensitivities towards pruning, calling for non-uniform model compression. However, a pruning method should not only identify a capable substructure, but also account for post-compression training. To this end, we propose \sysname, a method for training-aware structured pruning. \sysname builds upon an evolutionary search process, generating multiple offspring models in each generation through mutation, and selecting the fittest for survival. To assess the effect of post-training, we incorporate a lightweight, multistep training process within the offspring population, progressively increasing the number of tokens and eliminating poorly performing models in each selection stage. We validate our method through extensive experiments on Llama-2-7B, Llama-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-14B-Instruct, achieving state-of-the-art performance for structured pruning. For instance, \sysname surpasses ShearedLlama while requiring 5times less training data during post-compression training.

Safety alignment is critical for the responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted to scale model capacity, understanding their safety robustness becomes essential. Existing adversarial attacks, however, have notable limitations. Prompt-based jailbreaks rely on heuristic search and transfer poorly, model intervention methods require privileged access to internal representations, and optimization-based input attacks remain output-centric and are fundamentally limited to MoE models due to the non-differentiable routing mechanism. In this paper, we present RouteHijack, a routing-aware jailbreak for MoE LLMs. Our key insight is that safety behavior is concentrated in a small subset of experts, creating an opportunity to steer model behavior by influencing routing decisions through input optimization. Building on this observation, RouteHijack first performs response-driven expert localization to identify safety-critical and harmful experts by contrasting activations under safe refusals and harmful completions. It then constructs adversarial suffixes with a routing-aware objective that suppresses safety experts, promotes harmful experts, and prevents early-stage refusal during generation. At inference time, the optimized suffix is appended to a malicious prompt, requiring only input access. Across seven MoE LLMs, RouteHijack achieves a 69.3\% average attack success rate (ASR), outperforming prior optimization-based attack by 3.2times. RouteHijack also transfers zero-shot across five sibling MoE variants, raising average ASR from 27.7\% to 61.2\%, and further generalizes to three MoE-based VLMs, increasing average ASR from 2.47\% to 38.7\%. These findings expose a fundamental vulnerability in sparse expert architectures and highlight the need for defenses beyond output-level alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) serve as giant information stores, often including personal or copyrighted data, and retraining them from scratch is not a viable option. This has led to the development of various fast, approximate unlearning techniques to selectively remove knowledge from LLMs. Prior research has largely focused on minimizing the probabilities of specific token sequences by reversing the language modeling objective. However, these methods still leave LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit indirect references. In this work, we examine the limitations of current unlearning techniques in effectively erasing a particular type of indirect prompt: multi-hop queries. Our findings reveal that existing methods fail to completely remove multi-hop knowledge when one of the intermediate hops is unlearned. To address this issue, we propose MUNCH, a simple uncertainty-based approach that breaks down multi-hop queries into subquestions and leverages the uncertainty of the unlearned model in final decision-making. Empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, and MUNCH can be easily integrated with existing unlearning techniques, making it a flexible and useful solution for enhancing unlearning processes.

Large Language Models have proven highly successful at modelling a variety of tasks. However, this comes at a steep computational cost that hinders wider industrial uptake. In this pa005 per, we present MWT: a Multi-Word Tokenizer that goes beyond word boundaries by representing frequent multi-word expressions as single tokens. MWTs produce a more compact and efficient tokenization that yields two benefits: (1) Increase in performance due to a greater coverage of input data given a fixed sequence length and budget; (2) Faster and lighter inference due to the ability to reduce the sequence length with negligible drops in performance. Our results show that MWT is more robust across shorter sequence lengths, thus allowing for major speedups via early sequence truncation.